On Jun 16, 2015, at 3:33 AM, John Dickinson <j...@sinodun.com> wrote: > > > > On 15/06/2015 22:35, Paul Hoffman wrote: >>>>> "NSEC3": whether not NSEC3 is "quite different" from NSEC depends on your >>>>> context. Functionally, in the narrow sense of "allows verifiable denial >>>>> of existence", they are identical. I think it would be clearer to focus >>>>> on their functional similarities, and point out the additional features >>>>> of NSEC3 (opt-out and making zone enumeration harder), observing that any >>>>> particular signed zone must use exactly one of these, not both (so, they >>>>> are alternatives, and one of them is required). >>>> Disagree. Even in the "allows verifiable denial of existence", they are >>>> quite different in that the processing needed is very different. The >>>> "fundamental similarities" are only in what is achieve, not in the way of >>>> achieving it. >>> Perhaps we could agree on some text that confirms that they are >>> functionally similar, whilst having quite different approaches to achieving >>> that functionality? That seems like it would be better than declaring them >>> to be "quite different". >> The current text says: >> NSEC3: >> : The NSEC3 resource record is quite different than the NSEC resource record. >> Like the NSEC record, the NSEC3 record also provides authenticated denial of >> existence; however, >> NSEC3 records mitigates against zone enumeration and support Opt-Out. >> NSEC3 resource records are defined in {{RFC5155}}. >> >> I think the second sentence says what you want, and the first sentence is >> factually correct in the that the records themselves really are different. >> > I dislike the current text especially "is quite different than the NSEC > resource record"
OK, I'm hearing that we should remove that phrase. But, as someone who thought that the NSEC3 record would look like the NSEC record because versioning, I assure you that they really are quite different. :-) > > NSEC3: An alternative to NSEC. The NSEC3 RR allows verifiable denial of > existence. However, is allows the zone signer to "Opt-out" and not create an > NSEC3 RR at insecure (no DS) delegations. This has the advantage of allowing > the zone size to scale gracefully with the increase in signed delegations. > This is especially useful for operators of large delegation centric zones. In > addition, NSEC3 uses hashed owner names in order to make zone enumeration > approximately as hard as it would be in an unsigned zone. I'm hesitant to list "advantages", particularly ones that are only true for some kinds of zones. --Paul Hoffman _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop