On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 4:46 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matth...@nlnetlabs.nl> wrote:
> On 04/16/2014 06:40 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Dan York <y...@isoc.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Apr 16, 2014, at 8:02 AM, Warren Kumari <war...@kumari.net>
>>>  wrote:
>>>
>>> I think I made it even clearer:
>>> The first time a DNS operator signs a zone, they need to communicate
>>> the keying material to their parent through some out-of-band method to
>>> complete the chain of trust. Depending on the desires of the parent,
>>> the child might send their DNSKEY record, a DS record, or both.
>>>
>>> Good?
>>>
>>>
>>> Looks good to me.    The whole document is looking very good.  I've been
>>> reading the conversation and initially had some concerns but others already
>>> addressed the points (and so I felt no need to add to the queue of
>>> messages).
>>
>> ... and I got an off-list comment pointing out that:
>> "Section 6.1
>>          If the Parental Agent displays the contents
>>         of the CDS / CDSNKEY to the user and gets confirmation that
>>         this represents their key, the Parental Agent MAY use this for
>>         initial enrolment (when the Parent zone does not contain the DS
>>         for this delgation).
>>
>> But in section 4.1 you say
>>    o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>        current DNSKEY and DS RRset's."
>>
>> One of the two must be reworded."
>>
>> Doh! So, I have updated the "Signer" rule to be:
>> o  Signer: "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both the
>>     current DNSKEY and DS RRset's" (unless the parent validates the
>>     CDS / CDNSKEY though some other means (see Section 6.1 and the
>>     Security Considerations.))
>>
>> Any (major) objections?
>
> Yes:)
>
> The comment in 6.1 is meant for a way to use this technique for initial
> enrollment. So I would rather see that the rewording in 4.1 also
> reflects that: I don't want the regular maintenance to be susceptible to
> 'other means validation'. Suggestion:
>
> (unless the parent uses the CDS / CDNSKEY RRset for initial enrollment,
> in that case the parent validates the CDS / CDNSKEY though some other
> means (see Section 6.1 and the Security Considerations.))

Oooh! Nice.
I was unable to come up with a succinct way of saying that. Changed.
I also fixed a typo / thinko in the Acknowledgements section.

*This* time for sure,
W




>
> Best regards,
>   Matthijs
>
>>
>> This time for sure,
>> W
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>> --
>>> Dan York
>>> Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
>>> y...@isoc.org   +1-802-735-1624
>>> Jabber: y...@jabber.isoc.org
>>> Skype: danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork
>>>
>>> http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
>>>
>>>
>>
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>>
>

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