Hi Brijesh I reviewed the patch set. I have some basic questions. Please help me understand before I post my comment
If a platform supports SEV-SNP, can we assume SEV-ES is supported? Or is it a valid case that SecSnp==YES, SevEs==NO? I am trying to understand how many cases we need support. I think we want to support below: +------------------------+ | SEV | SEV_ES | SEV_SNP | +------------------------+ | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 0 | 0 | | 1 | 1 | 0 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | +------------------------+ Any other combination we need support? Such as below: +------------------------+ | SEV | SEV_ES | SEV_SNP | +------------------------+ | 0 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 0 | 1 | +------------------------+ Thank you Yao Jiewen > -----Original Message----- > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 1:42 AM > To: devel@edk2.groups.io > Cc: James Bottomley <j...@linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m...@intel.com>; > Yao, Jiewen <jiewen....@intel.com>; Tom Lendacky > <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>; > Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianoc...@kernel.org>; Laszlo Ersek > <ler...@redhat.com>; Erdem Aktas <erdemak...@google.com>; Dong, Eric > <eric.d...@intel.com>; Ni, Ray <ray...@intel.com>; Kumar, Rahul1 > <rahul1.ku...@intel.com>; Kinney, Michael D <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>; > Liming Gao <gaolim...@byosoft.com.cn>; Liu, Zhiguang > <zhiguang....@intel.com>; Michael Roth <michael.r...@amd.com>; Brijesh > Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com> > Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) > support > > BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 > > SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding > new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory > integrity > protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data > replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory > encryption environment. > > This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP > VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP > such as interrupt protection. > > Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP > VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the > guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to > guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE > instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request > NAE" > defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page > from the RMP table. > > Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated, > as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two > approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and > Lazy Validation. > > Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under > lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a > unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception > handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of > the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The > recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate > the > unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. > > At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the > available > system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated > before it is made available to the EDK2 core. > > This series does not implements the following SEV-SNP features yet: > > * CPUID filtering > * Lazy validation > * Interrupt security > > Additional resources > --------------------- > SEV-SNP whitepaper > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm- > isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf > > APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36) > > The complete source is available at > https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-4 > > GHCB spec: > https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf > > SEV-SNP firmware specification: > https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf > > Brijesh Singh (26): > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move SEV specific code in a separate file > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to invoke MSR protocol based > VMGEXIT > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to request guest termination > OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page > OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase > OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page > UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() > OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM > OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI > phase > OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD > MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version > UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is > enabled > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table > OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map > OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration > table > > Tom Lendacky (1): > UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs > > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 24 + > UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 11 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 + > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 6 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +- > OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 14 +- > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 + > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 + > .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 + > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 8 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 6 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 3 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 4 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 4 + > MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +- > .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 18 + > OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 ++ > .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 31 ++ > .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 19 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 19 + > OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 + > .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 + > .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++ > .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 + > .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++ > .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++- > .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 126 ++++++ > .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 36 ++ > .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 295 +++++++++++++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 192 ++++++++ > OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 21 + > OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 111 +++++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 11 +- > .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 31 ++ > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 275 +++++++++++- > .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 44 ++ > OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 + > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 27 ++ > .../Ia32/{PageTables64.asm => AmdSev.asm} | 415 +++++++++--------- > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 404 +---------------- > OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 7 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 1 + > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 51 +++ > 48 files changed, 1978 insertions(+), 630 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c > create mode 100644 > OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c > create mode 100644 > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c > create mode 100644 > UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c > copy OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/{PageTables64.asm => AmdSev.asm} (67%) > > -- > 2.17.1 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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