On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 05:59:37PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 11:36:27PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote: > > 1) Implementing a quorum seems to have a lower risk of damaging > > Condorcet voting, than the discussed supermajority strategies have. > > This is a very interesting point. > > In fact, there are a number of insincere strategies around quorum, > but we expect that they're not important because people using those > strategies can only cause the default option to win, and the default > option is just a short delay until the next vote. > > What would you think of an implementation of supermajority which has > this same general characteristic? [I ask this because Anthony Town's > most recent implied draft presents an implementation of supermajority > with exactly this property.]
How does it have this property?
As I understand Anthony Town's proposal, the supermajority
requirement can kick out single options. After that the
Condorcet method is used to find a winner (which not needs
to be the default option). In
A = change the scoial contract and remove non-free
(Requires supermajority)
B = try to nurture and increase non-free
(Requires no supermajority)
C = further discussion
it could easily happen that A get's kicked out and B wins then.
(Exmaple: 200 ABC, 102 BAC, 101 CAB)
Or did I understand this wrong?
Jochen
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Omm
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http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/privat.html
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