Notes: This is a revision of the Nov 24th draft of the A.6 rewrite
(http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200211/msg00332.html),
incorporating the A.3 changes from
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200210/msg00024.html
as well as some of the other points mentioned in
http://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2002/debian-vote-200211/msg00334.html
In addition, I've attempted to resolve the ambiguities about the default
option between 5.2 and A.3, and I've given up trying to come up with a
good name for the voting process.
Also, I've reinstated the "winning option must meet quorum requirements",
because I feel that this will encourage people to vote in otherwise
unpopular elections. [Or, at least, I think this will discourage people
less than the idea that voting the default option first may cause another
option to win.]
As always: if there are flaws with this proposal, please let me know.
______________________________________________________________________
General notes on the election process as it applies to this election:
Once we've got an "original proposal" that at least some of us are
reasonably happy with it will be reasonable for people to propose
alternative amendments.
For this proposal to be accepted, it must win an election under the
current constitution. This proposal has a 3:1 majority requirement.
Because the current constitution does not provide for a way of voting on
items with mixed majority requirements, because it is somewhat ambiguous
when dealing with cyclic conflicts among good options, and because it
does allow the secretary to force amendments to be considered on separate
ballots, it's probably a good idea to limit the alternative proposals
to a small number (0 is ok, and so is 1 or 2) of distinct constitutional
amendments (all with a 3:1 majority requirement).
______________________________________________________________________
DRAFT:
______________________________________________________________________
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes and tallies results
are not be revealed during the voting period; after the vote the
Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting period is
2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the Project Leader,
and may be ended by the Project Secretary when enough voters have
voted that even if every remaining voter voted in opposition to
the winner the outcome would remain the same. In this context, we
ignore the possibility that people might want to change their vote.
______________________________________________________________________
Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
7. The decision will be made using A.6 of the Standard Resolution
Procedure. The quorum is the same as for a General Resolution
(s.4.2) except the default option is None Of The Above.
______________________________________________________________________
Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of the
committee are automatically nominated; the committee vote starting
one week before the post will become vacant (or immediately, if it
is already too late). The members may vote by public acclamation
for any fellow committee member, including themselves; there is
no default option. The vote finishes when all the members have
voted or when the outcome is no longer in doubt. The result is
determined using A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
______________________________________________________________________
Replace A.3 with:
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each independent set of related amendments is voted on in a
separate ballot. Each such ballot has as options all the sensible
combinations of amendments and options from that set, and a default
option. If the default option wins then the entire resolution
procedure is set back to the start of the discussion period.
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The vote taker (if there is one) or the voters (if voting is done
by public pronouncement) may arrange for independent ballots
to be held simultaneously, even (for example) using a single
voting message.
4. Votes may be cast during the voting period, as specified elsewhere.
If the voting period can end if the outcome is no longer in
doubt, the possibility that voters may change their votes is
not considered.
5. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6 If a
quorum is required then the default option is Further Discussion.
6. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
of procedure (for example, whether particular amendments should
be considered independent or not).
______________________________________________________________________
Replace A.5 with:
A.5. Expiry
If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
if appropriate.
______________________________________________________________________
Replace A.6 with:
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered preferred
to all unranked options. Unranked options are not considered
preferred to other unranked options. Voters may rank options
equally. The other details of how ballots may be filled out
will be included in the Call For Votes.
2. We construct the Schwartz set based on undropped options and
defeats:
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
defeat A.
b. An option, A, transitively defeats an option, C, if A
defeats C or if there is some other option, B, where A
defeats B AND B transitively defeats C.
c. An option, A, defeats an option, B, if N(A,B)*V(A,B) is
larger than N(A,B)*V(B,A), and the (A,B) defeat has not
been dropped.
d. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
e. If a majority of n:1 is required for A, and B is the default
option, N(B,A) is n. In all other cases, N(B,A) is 1.
3. If there are defeats within the Schwartz set, we drop the weakest
such defeats, and return to step 2.
a. A defeat is in the Schwartz set if both of its options are
in the Schwartz set.
b. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if A is not
the default option and V(A,X) is less than V(B,Y). Also,
(A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) A is not the default option and if
V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
c. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
3. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set where at least at
least Q voters ranked that option above default option, where Q
is the quorum requirement for the ballot. If there is only one
such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple options, the
elector with a casting vote chooses which of those options wins.
"RATIONALE": Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
option are unacceptable options. If no agreement can be reached
on an acceptable option the issue warrants further consideration.
______________________________________________________________________
Thanks,
--
Raul
--
To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
