Hi, On Wed, May 24, 2006 at 06:52:59AM +0200, Mike Dornberger wrote: > So what can happen? {SYN,ICMP} floods, TCP RST attacks, but the last one is > then just guesswork (assuming the attacker can't see the real traffic at > 192.168.0.0/24 else you already have a big problem). Am I missing something?
Unfortunately, it's very common for an attacker to be able to watch local traffic if you're on a hostile network with your laptop, for example... > I have a rule for spoofed localhost addresses, I took from someone else some > time ago at top of my INPUT chain: > > iptables -A INPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -i ! lo -j DROP Nice. There are probably more (similar) things you can do. I need to read a bit more about how rp_filter and friends work. Isn't the above already covered by rp_filter or some similar config option? > Hm, I often see people first cleaning/flushing/deleting the rules and then > setting the default policy. If the policy was for some reason set to ACCEPT, > you have a small time window when packets will be accepted, that got dropped > or rejected before by the rules you just deleted. Why not first set the > policy to DROP and then deleting rules? Good point. But is the default policy deleted or reset after a clean/flush/delete? If not, this is probably a good idea. > Something different I saw at various iptables scripts, that I don't quite > understand: Why do people put so much rules into the OUTPUT chain? Easy - for increased security. With this approach I know exactly which traffic will go out of my computer (on which ports). Anything running on my computer trying to use some other port is logged. I can then decide whether I just missed a rule (i.e. it's valid traffic) and adapt the script accordingly, or if it's some nasty application, trojan, rootkit, spyware, whatever which tries to "phone home"... For example, I remember having heard of a version of Adobe Acrobat Reader (for Linux) secretly connecting to some obscure Adobe server and sending some information (don't know whether it was a fake or not)... This kind of stuff can (sometimes) be prevented by filtering OUTPUT. Another example: I don't want to _ever_ use unencrypted POP3 to fetch emails, so I block that port. Now I simply cannot do that mistake, not even by accident. > For > single user workstation/notebooks it hinders yourself a lot. E. g. you allow > access to some services like HTTP or SSH on other hosts. But what if you > want to connect to host that has that service running on an unusual port? > You then need to tweak you iptables script as root... Exactly :) > Is it because you don't trust the software that is running? That's one of the reasons, yes. Trust noone ;) > Especially since > this is a Debian mailing list here: You have the sources. If a service can't > bind to only 127.0.0.1, change it! True. Still, sometimes you (or your local users) might run software you don't know, didn't check, or which is simply closed-source. Again, a firewall might help here in certain situations. > Or is it because you don't trust the other users there? That can be another reason. Trust noone ;) > Why do they have an > account then or a computer that is connected to the internet (assuming you > don't want them to surf or run some file exchange/p2p service)? Sometimes they want/need an account. If you don't (fully) trust them, you can limit the amount of damage they can do somewhat. One method for doing so is a firewall. > Once you > allow a user to just connect to a single port "out there", he might start to > tunnel stuff if he really wants to do something else... True. > (ssh over HTTP someone?) Or ssh over DNS. > Maybe blocking something in OUTPUT is reasonable for servers as a stumbling > block if a service got taken over but then it probably won't be long until > the intruder got root access there and removes the rules anyway. True. Of course, it's not a complete "now we're 100% safe" method, but it helps prevent _some_ problems. Cheers, Uwe. -- Uwe Hermann http://www.hermann-uwe.de http://www.it-services-uh.de | http://www.crazy-hacks.org http://www.holsham-traders.de | http://www.unmaintained-free-software.org
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