additionally, nobody should have their creds stored anyway other than their own machine.
On Sat, Dec 8, 2018 at 3:49 PM Allen Wittenauer <a...@effectivemachines.com.invalid> wrote: > > > > On Dec 7, 2018, at 11:56 PM, Alex Harui <aha...@adobe.com.INVALID> > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 12/7/18, 10:49 PM, "Allen Wittenauer" > > <a...@effectivemachines.com.INVALID> > wrote: > > > > > > > >> On Dec 7, 2018, at 10:22 PM, Alex Harui <aha...@adobe.com.INVALID> > wrote: > >> > >> Maven's release plugins commit and push to Git and upload to > repository.a.o. I saw that some folks have a node that can commit to the > a.o website SVN. Is anyone already doing releases from builds? What > issues are there, if any? > > > > It's just flat out not secure enough to do a release on. > > > > Can you give me an example of how it isn't secure enough? > > > The primary purpose of these servers is to run untested, > unverified code. > > Jenkins has some very sharp security corners that makes it > trivially un-trustable. Something easy to understand: when Jenkins is > configured to run multiple builds on a node, all builds on that node run in > the same user space. Because there is no separation between executors, it's > very possible for anyone to execute something that modifies another running > build. For example, probably the biggest bang for the least amount of work > would be to replace jars in the shared maven cache. > > [... and no, Docker doesn't help.] > > There are other, bigger problems, but I'd rather not put that out > in the public. > > > -- Gav...