On Thursday, October 22, 2015 8:26:58 AM Christian Decker wrote: > I think the scenario of the single signer re-ordering the outputs and > inputs and then re-signing the transaction is in the same category of > simple double-spends. The signer could just as well sign a completely > different transaction spending the same coins to somewhere else, so I don't > think there is a lot we can do about it even if we instate a canonical > ordering. Even if we order the inputs and outputs the signer can just add a > new input and output and we would have a different transaction. > > Normalized transaction IDs do help in the case that the single signer wants > to immediately follow up its transaction with another transaction spending > the first one's change output, and it prevents any modification in the > multi-signer scenario.
Except that unlike malicious double spending, adding more outputs to unconfirmed transactions is what wallets *should ideally be doing every time they send another transaction*. Spending unconfirmed change is the wrong approach. So half-fixing malleability as this PR would, encourages inefficient behaviour in multiple ways (first, by not making it malleability- safe; second, by encouraging spending unconfirmed change). Luke _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
