> On May 3, 2019, at 08:24 , Keith W. Hare <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Andrew,
>  
> So far, I have seen lots of discussion of the issue but I have not seen a 
> single concise coherent complete definition of the BGP hijacking problem that 
> includes:

I”ll take a stab, but there are reasons for the lack of information… We don’t 
really know…

> ·         What technical mechanisms are used to create a BGP hijack

There are two principle mechanisms involved:
        1.      (Easiest and most common) Find a location in the internet where 
you can inject a route and have it propagate and exploit it.
        2.      (less common but does happen) Find address space issued to a 
defunct organization or an organization that does not appear
                to be actively using it and attempt to steal it from them 
through the RIR process by creating a new similar
                looking organization and then attempting to fraudulently 
“reclaim” the resources.

> ·         How BGP hijacking is initiated

See answer to previous bullet.

> ·         Why BGP hijacking is possible

Because there are lots of entry points in to the routing system which are 
poorly filtered.

> ·         The frequency of BGP hijacking instances

Relatively rare so far, but not unheard of.

> ·         How long BGP hijacking instances last

Varies… By far, the most common one is snow shoe spamming which only needs a 
day or two at most, and even a few hours
is quite productive for them.

> ·         The locations of BGP hijacking instances

This varies and I don’t know that there is ever going to be anything like a 
comprehensive list.

> ·         How information about BGP hijacking instances can be gathered

Tough question. So far, nobody has a particularly good answer.
 
> Without a really clear definition of the problem, it is hard to evaluate the 
> effectiveness of the proposed process.
>  
> So far, it is not at all clear to me how the process described in proposal 
> 266 will have any effect on the problem, but that may be because I do not 
> fully understand the problem.

I think it’s more likely because the process described in 256 will not have 
much effect.

Owen

>  
> Keith
>   <>
> From: ARIN-PPML [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Andrew Bagrin
> Sent: Friday, May 3, 2019 10:05 AM
> To: Marilson Mapa <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP 
> Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation
>  
> I'm curious why do people not want to let ARIN try to start getting involved 
> to help resolve the issue of hijacking?
>  
> Are you doing hijacking and don't want interference?
> Are you running a competitive service that you charge for?
>  
> Does anyone believe there is a valid reason to hijack and advertise IP space 
> that you do not own? (when the owner of that space does not want you to 
> advertise it)
>  
> Why would anyone be against ARIN having a process to help resolve these 
> issues?  Sure we can question how effective it will be, but anything will be 
> more effective than nothing, and by actually doing, failing and learning, 
> ARIN will only improve and refine the process. We will all learn from this.
>  
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