Counterargument (ignore this one, it probably doesn't work): when Quazie placed a bid, e essentially stated that "I will have sufficient money to pay at the end of the voting period. Really. I promise." This is part of the common language definition of what it means to bid. However, since bidding is redefined by the rules, they wanted to make it clear that that implication still exists, and that's what the relevant clause is saying. Absent evidence that this failure was merely a mistake, it is a lie. Admittedly, this one is a stretch, but it seems worth trying, given that it's so much fun. I may propose codifying some version of this.
Second counterargument (this one is for real): I'd like to point out that while we prohibit future conditionals for users, there's nothing prohibiting them for rules. This seems like a fairly straightforward future conditional. The rule is clearly stating that the evaluation of the illegality is deferred until the end of the auction. Why anyone would write a rule this way is beyond me, but it seems to be pretty clear that this is what it's saying. Your analogies are flawed because in those cases the back-propagation is implicit. Of course we don't pretend that conditionals are to resolved based on future information when the rule in question refers to present information, nor do we pretend that illegality propagates backward where the rule is not written in a retroactive way (although the rule could be written in such a way if the author chose, Agora has no rule prohibiting ex post fact laws). I propose that "A person SHALL NOT bid on an Auction if it would be impossible for em to pay that amount at the conclusion of the Auction." is best read as equivalent to "A person SHALL NOT bid on an auction, if, at the end of the auction, e will be unable to pay" under the standard rules of English. If a contract did this, it would be an inextricable conditional and fail. In this case though, we just have to wait until the end of the auction for it to become extricable so that we can determine whether the bidder broke the rule. -Aris On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 1:07 PM Corona <liliumalbum.ag...@gmail.com> wrote: > Indeed: > 1} It is only ILLEGAL to *place* unpayable bids, not to hold them. > > 2) At the point in time when I (well, Quazie) was placing the bid, the > conditional that determines the illegality was INEXTRICABLE. Only when the > auction ended did the conditional became TRUE and the action *became* > ILLEGAL. > > 3) There is consensus that illegality does not propagate back in time - > analogy: > CuddleBeam "nabbed the stuffs" some time ago. A proposal was then passed > that made such actions IMPOSSIBLE, and that did not explicitly restrict its > applicability to the future only. Yet, nobody even thought for a moment > that CB's actions were retroactively made IMPOSSIBLE, as that would be > absurd. I believe the (lack of) reaction would be similar if the proposal > merely made "nabbing the stuffs" ILLEGAL. Another analogy would be that > changes to values of switches don't travel to the past to affect the > actions taken back then, and you could consider legality a kind of a hidden > switch. > > Ergo, placing the bid was an action whose legality was INEXTRICABLE when I > performed it, and any changes to the legality of the action afterward had > no effect on the legality of my performing of the action in the past. (and > the relevant rule is broken) > > > ~Corona > > On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 9:07 PM, Kerim Aydin <ke...@u.washington.edu> > wrote: > > > > > > > Gratuitous: > > > > "Allowed to act on behalf" in R2532 is a specific and intentional > > reference to > > "allows [...] to act on behalf" in Rule 2466: > > > > When a rule allows one person (the agent) to act on behalf of > > another (the principal) to perform an action, that agent CAN > > perform the action if it is POSSIBLE for the principal to do so, > > taking into account any prerequisites for the action. > > > > So in this particular context, "allowed to act on behalf" implies "CAN > act > > on > > behalf". > > > > At least that was the direct and specific intent when I wrote it - I > > intended > > illegal actions on behalf of zombies to fail because they weren't > > "allowed", > > therefore blocking the CAN in R2466. Intent doesn't always mean much, > and > > I can see that the link to R2466 isn't abundantly clear, but that > "allows" > > in > > R2466 should definitely be considered in this context. > > > > What's more interesting to me on this case is whether it "would be > > impossible" > > for the zombie to pay. It requires evaluating a future conditional to > see > > if > > a current bid is legal. In this case, the strict impossibility (lack of > > funds) would have been easily overcome before the end-of-auction if > Corona > > had > > given Quazie a Coin before the auction ended. Do we decide the > > impossibility > > based on the immediate condition (Quazie not having a coin during > > bidding)? > > > > If this were the intent, why not just cancel the bid when it happens and > > not > > at the end of the auction? The Rule clearly allows bidding if you expect > > to > > be able to pay in future (e.g. if you expected the beginning of the month > > to > > happen before the auction ended, to give you salary). > > > > I tend to think "impossible" in this future conditional should apply only > > to > > things clearly impossible that can't be made possible with expected > > resources > > without a rule change - e.g. bidding i, or aleph-null, or more coins > than a > > player could reasonably expect to accumulate, in an attempt to spike the > > auction. If Corona fully intends to give Quazie a Coin, and Corona has a > > coin, I don't think you could say it was Impossible (when the bid was > made) > > for Quazie to pay at the end of the auction. > > > > > > On Thu, 19 Apr 2018, Aris Merchant wrote: > > > I point my finger at Corona for violations of Rule 2532, "Zombies", > > > and/or Rule 2466, "Acting on Behalf", committed by causing Quazie to > > > violate Rule 2550, "Bidding". I CFJ, barring G., on the statement > > > 'Rule 2532, "Zombies", enables zombie owners to act on behalf of their > > > zombies.' I CFJ, barring Corona, on the statement 'Corona has > > > violated of Rule 2532, "Zombies", and/or Rule 2466, "Acting on > > > Behalf", by causing Quazie to violate Rule 2550 "Bidding".' > > > > > > [For reference, I don't really see how a violation could have been > > > committed, but this is all rather unclear and I'd like to see what > > > people think." > > > > > > Arguments: > > > > > > If Quazie bid in the auction, e committed a violation of Rule 2550, > > > "Bidding", and in particular the provision that "A person SHALL NOT > > > bid on an Auction if it would be impossible for em to pay that amount > > > at the conclusion of the Auction." Quazie did not have any money at > > > the time of the bid, and did not get any by the end of the auction. We > > > clearly do not hold em culpable for this violation, given that we do > > > not in general hold people responsible for violations they could not > > > reasonably have avoided, but the violation remains nevertheless. > > > > > > If Corona successfully caused Quazie to bid, e violated Rule 2466, > > > "Acting on Behalf", and specifically the provision that "A person > > > SHALL NOT act on behalf of another person if doing so causes the > > > second person to violate the rules." What remains in question is > > > whether or not Corona's action succeeded. There are three > > > possibilities: it succeeded, it failed in this specific case, or it > > > never works at all. I believe that it is one of the later two. > > > > > > The crucial question is one of interpreting Rule 2532, "Zombies". > > > which states that "A zombie's master, if another player, is allowed to > > > act on behalf of the zombie (i.e. as the zombie's agent) to perform > > > LEGAL actions." The phrase "allowed to" is ambiguous, it could mean > > > CAN or MAY, although I find it somewhat unlikely that it means both of > > > them at once. If it means CAN, then the action failed because the > > > action was ILLEGAL, and the affixed conditional resolves to false. > > > > > > I believe that the phrase probably means MAY. Granted, the Rule 217 > > > factors suggest that the phrase means CAN, but I don't think that they > > > can overturn the presumption to the contrary in this case. I'm not > > > saying that "allow' can never mean "enable', but reading "allowed to" > > > to mean "able to" doesn't really sound right. For instance, seems > > > reasonable for someone to say "I will allow you to open your mind", > > > but (to my ears) it sounds ridiculous to say that "you are allowed to > > > open your mind". I think the only reason there even appears to be > > > ambiguity is because of preconceived notions of what the zombie rule > > > means. Reading the text without judgement, the MAY reading is the > > > obvious one. Under this reading, there is no provision anywhere that > > > says that an owner CAN act on behalf of a zombie, so e can't. > > > > > > -Aris > > > > > > > > > >
