ais523 wrote:
> Further arguments:
> {{{
> A person SHALL NOT make a public statement on a matter relevant
> to the rules unless e reasonably believes that it is true (or,
> in the case of a public statement that one performs an action,
> that is effective).
> }}}
> Even if I had believed that my statement as a statement were false, it
> was an action; and in the case of actions, all that matters is that they
> are effective (so that they fulfil the condition of being true /or/
> effective). I don't think anyone could sensibly argue that the intents
> themselves are ineffective; impossible to resolve under certain
> circumstances, maybe, but not ineffective.This may possibly save you, but I'm still not convinced that "to intend" is a proper action, despite its grammatical status as a verb. In its natural-language meaning, which I maintain that the Rules do not overwrite, "I intend" is a description of a passive mental state, like "I understand" or "I doubt". It's not an activity that can be either effective or ineffective, like lifting a box or spending a coin. In short, I am arguing that intent is (1) like contracts, recognized rather than defined by the Rules; and (2) a passive mental state, like the state of a switch, rather than an action, like flipping the state of a switch.
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