On Thu, 14 Aug 2008, Geoffrey Spear wrote: > On Thu, Aug 14, 2008 at 3:00 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> 2. By CFJ 1303 and 1895, the statement publisher = statement sender >> and remains you (the physical sender of the message), even when you >> act on behalf of someone else. >> ------dividing line here ------------ >> 3. For CFJ 1791 to work, we must accept the legal fiction that the >> announcement was the Other's "action". > > I assume you mean CFJ 1719, which I believe is somewhat invalidated by > the passage of Rule 2170, which would, in my reading, allow someone in > a similar situation as Peekee was then to simply make a CoE on the > claimed identity of the sender. > > In any case, I think it's bad precedent; Peekee didn't, IIRC, > explicitly authorize anyone to act on eir behalf; e simply provided a > means to send messages that claimed to be from em.
That's not the part of CFJ 1719 that's relevant here. The CFJ1719 arguments went to great lengths to show that the authorization is possible and legal if unquestionably given (e.g. if given through an email statement "I hereby authorize you to..."), which is what my above arguments are about. The only thing we're quibbling about here is questioning here is what constitutes "authorization". It *additionally* stated that the web form was sufficient authorization, and I actually agree with you that I think Zefram's opinion was weak on that score. There was discussion at the time about various means of "authorize", for example, if I gave you my account name and password did I therefore authorize... I think Zefram followed up that eir precedent was supposed to imply "yes" for such situations. > One could argue > that by publishing your email address here you've given me the means > to forge messages from you, and thus if I do so they should be taken > to be published by you and to let me act on your behalf. There's certainly a stretch between directly providing an interface and providing knowledge for producing something that is called a "forgery." (e.g. that's like the old "if I leave my door unlocked, stealing from me isn't a crime"). > I'd now be in > violation of Rule 2170 for doing so, but really, the evidence against > someone breaking that rule would, unless they were fairly inept, be > pretty weak. In the age of webmail, tracing the actual sender of any > message is practically impossible without an enforceable power of > subpoena, and difficult even then. Again, we're talking about what R1719 says in cases where the intent of the grantor to give authorization is not disputed, but the ability of the grantor to make the authorization (and the Power of Attorney holder's ability to act on it) is in question. -Goethe
