On Wed, Jun 25, 2008 at 11:23 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I change all sitting players to standing. > > The following are linked assignments. > > Detail: http://zenith.homelinux.net/cotc/viewcase.php?cfj=2040 > > ============================== CFJ 2040 ============================== > > If a partnership is party to another contract, individual > members of the contract may be required, by an equity settlement > involving the second contract, to be parties to the settlement, > even if the partnership agreement does not explicitly allow > this. > > ============================== CFJ 2041 ============================== > > If a partnership incurs contract obligations from another > contract while a particular member is a member, and that member > departs the partnership, the member in question may be required > by an equity settlement involving the second contract to be a > party to the settlement, even if the partnership agreement > does not explicitly allow this.
> ============================== CFJ 2042 ============================== > > If a partnership dissolves after having incurred obligations > from another contract, the former members may be required by an > equity settlement involving the second contract to be a parties > to the settlement. > > ======================================================================== Rule 2169 plainly says that "the judgement is in effect as a binding agreement between the parties [of the original contract].". So, the only parties to the equation are the parties to the contract, which may or may not be partnerships. There is not one iota of ambiguity in that sentence. Even if a partnership agreement explicitly says that a settlement to a contract it's in can (before any membership changes) have its members as parties, it's a lie, because the agreement has no authority to override Rule 2169 with respect to the parties of the equation. Of course, such a settlement might allow and/or require other people to join it, and these people may indeed be indirectly obligated to do so, but if the partnership no longer exists or something, there is no mechanism by which they can be obligated to join an equation. The only times when the parties to an equation might start out with a different set of parties than the original contract is when a Rule with higher power than Rule 2169 is in conflict with it. That R101's protection against being forced into contracts applies to equations is extremely reasonable; that Rule 2145 mentioning what a partnership should be forces equations to have different parties to satisfy that definition is not. If a partnership allows "membership games" that would prevent an equation from applying to its members (who broke the rules through the partnership), then you could argue that that partnership is therefore not a person because it does not devolve its responsibilities. Unfortunately, because the Rules explicitly allow at least one method (agreement between all parties to terminate the contract) that would allow a person who broke the Rules through a partnership to escape an equation, despite whatever the contract says, you would have to say that ALL partnerships do not satisfactorily devolve their responsibilities onto their members, so no currently existing partnerships are actually partnerships. I don't agree with this though, because I think devolving responsibilities is not this complicated process Goethe envisions, but pretty clear-cut: "The parties SHALL act to ensure that the partnership meets its repsonsibilities..." should be sufficient, because this is sufficient to enable a criminal case to be brought against any party who broke the rules through a partnership, regardless of any future changes in membership. Presently, I'm pretty sure that the equity court is a very weak one, because a) it cannot effectively deal with partnerships, and b) every party clearly has the R101 (iv) right to refuse to agree to an equation. Its only present use is to facilitate equity between parties to a contract if they can agree on a solution (whether this is what real-life equity courts do is irrelevant). Now, because of the equity spirit being often in conflict with the "spirit of the game", and because the court is still new, and because of the clear potential for abuse-- considering the circumstances, Goethe's judgement of the bank robbery equity case may be reasonable, but the same power could be used for quite a bit of evil, especially if an appeals panel is bribed to judge AFFIRM-- I support this role for the equity court. The role can be changed by proposal, but I think trying to strengthen the equity court via the judicial system, when the relevant Rules seem (to me) pretty unambiguous, is a losing battle.
