On Tue, 15 Jan 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> Now here's a queer thing. If a partnership is has the "general > capacity...", and it ceases to be a person, but it can still be bound > by any and all of the same the agreements it was bound by as a person, > then there's no reason to presume that it couldn't hypothetically be > bound by any of the same agreements it previously could hypothetically > have been bound by, so long as they don't specifically exempt it. > Thus it must retain that same "general capacity...." But according to > CFJs 1622 and 1623, this is precisely what makes it a person! Except, we've just changed the rules so that these CFJs no longer apply. It's no longer enough to retain the capacity, the partnership must be public. So it's no contradiction that the contract didn't change and is still binding, but is no longer sufficient for personhood due to some technicality (of not being public). -Goethe
