We have a lovely system where all the influences on voting power are persistent (for a period of time), not per proposal. It is marred by per-proposal rewards. We've just discussed per-proposal voting power, which has been done before. Let's consider the other approach: time-based rewards for proposals.
Suppose that the VC reward for proposals were for getting at least one proposal passed during a week. Each week, each person gets at most one such reward. It encourages everyone to make proposals, on a regular basis, which I think would be a good thing. Those who propose a lot at once neither gain nor lose from doing so. There is no incentive to duplicate proposals, no incentive to gratuitously split proposals, no incentive to merge logically-distinct proposals. The only incentive it applies on proposing behaviour is to spread a batch of proposals out in time, which is pretty innocuous. Comments? -zefram
