On 13/01/2020 14:07, George Dunlap wrote:
On 1/13/20 2:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 13/01/2020 13:39, Julien Grall wrote:
Hi George,
Thank you for summarising the possibility. One question below.
On 13/01/2020 12:51, George Dunlap wrote:
2. Block XENVER_extraversion at the hypervisor level. Leave xen_deny()
as returning "<denied>", but replace "<denied>" with "" in hvmloader so
it doesn't show up in the System Info and scare users.
3. Block XENVER_extraversion at the hypervisor level. Change xen_deny()
to return a more benign string like "<hidden>". (Perhaps also filter it
in hvmloader, just for good measure.)
My knowledge of live migration on x86 is a bit limited, but if I
understand correctly those two options would require a guest to reboot
in order to pick up the changes. Am I correct?
Not in the slightest. The content returned changes whenever the
hypervisor changes.
I guess Julien is talking about the filtering done in hvmloader. That
filtering is about what's in the guest's ACPI tables; and *that* happens
only once at guest boot; so whatever the scary message is in the Windows
System Information page (or wherever it is) would stay there until the
guest reboots, regardless of which option we go with.
Yes, I was speaking about the filtering done in hvmloader. Thank you
both for the explanation.
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
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