>>> On 23.06.15 at 11:57, <tiejun.c...@intel.com> wrote:
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
> @@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d,
> bool_t map,
>
> while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
> {
> - if ( intel_iommu_unmap_page(d, base_pfn) )
> + if ( guest_physmap_remove_page(d, base_pfn, base_pfn, 0) )
> ret = -ENXIO;
> base_pfn++;
> }
> @@ -1855,8 +1855,7 @@ static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d,
> bool_t map,
>
> while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
> {
> - int err = intel_iommu_map_page(d, base_pfn, base_pfn,
> - IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
> + int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw);
Shouldn't the two continue to be the inverse of one another?
Maybe guest_physmap_remove_page() does what you want,
but it looks like at least an abuse.
Jan
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