On 02/09/2015 01:53 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
In preparation for allowing for introspecting ARM and PV domains the old
control interface via the hvm_op hypercall is retired. A new control mechanism
is introduced via the domctl hypercall: monitor_op.
This patch aims to establish a base API on which future applications can build
on.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.leng...@zentific.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campb...@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.t...@intel.com>
One minor typo, then:
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgde...@tycho.nsa.gov>
[...]
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index 9da3275..35d1c7b 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ class hvm
# HVMOP_inject_trap
hvmctl
# XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required
+# XEN_DOMCLT_monitor_op
+# XEN_DOMCLT_vm_event_op
vm_event
# XEN_DOMCTL_mem_sharing_op and XENMEM_sharing_op_{share,add_physmap} with:
# source = the domain making the hypercall
DOMCLT => DOMCTL
--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency
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