>...
>Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 00:51:25 -0500
>From: "Daryl C. W. O'Shea" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>...
>To: List Mail User <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
>        users@spamassassin.apache.org
>Subject: Re: Webmail and IP rules
>...
>
        Dayrl,

        As is usually the case, I didn't give all of the details which may
apply.

>List Mail User wrote:
>>      Dave,
>> 
>>      You have a few valid points, and the rule may be misnamed with
>> HELO at its prefix;  But look at some email coming from the free services
>> like Yahoo!, Hotmail or Gmail and you will see HTTP (as well as other
>> protocols; Hotmail/MSN also uses both of the MS proprietary protocols "DAV"
>> and "SMTPSVC").  I also have copies of some messages from "mindspring.com"
>> (re. Earthlink), "gmx.com" and "mail.ru" where the initial hop was HTTP and
>> these are "ham".  In addition, I also have *lots* of saved spam from 
>> "mail.ru"
>> where the transfer initially was HTTP.
>
>I don't recall seeing 'with DAV' in anything but Hotmail headers.  Is a 
>product that uses this availble to the public?  Is it _always_ an 
>authenticated hop?

        This I don't know, but likely can call connections at MS and ask (which
unfortunately does not guarantee and answer, but makes one likely).

>
>Exchange, or even the stripped down SMTP service in Windows Server 
>2000/2003 all use 'with SMTPSVC', but it's not always an authenticated 
>hop, so it's useless as an authentication token.
>
>
>>      The name "HELO_xxx" may be bad, but the rule is good.  The problems
>> lie with IMP and its attempts to "create/forge" an initial header.  Of 
>> course,
>> an "easy" work around is to simply "unmark" the next hop as trusted, then the
>> message will look like any message forwarded trough a legitimate commercial
>> "free" system or from a dynamic/dial-up user to his ISP's web interface and
>> your "problem" will disappear.  Personally, I don't even mark my "back-up"
>> 'MX's as trusted, and have never seen a problem with this (though some extra
>> computation and DNS lookups are performed as a result).
>
>Not including your 'back-up' MX is a bad idea.  You'll loose lots of 
>tests, such as the tests for mail coming straight from dynamic IPs, and 
>you'll cause SPF checks to result in an SPF fail.

        Here is an important missing detail - the 'back-up' MXs not under my
direct control do their own SPF and DUL checks and add headers, which I have
local rules for and believe (though just two weeks ago a spammmer setup a /29
with my ISP and was using my 'back-up' as his relay!  It took a quick note to
the VP of engineering and the spammer was gone inside of 15 minutes (good ISP,
now *very* large, but I've been dealing with them for >12 years and remember
when the VP was a tech. who answered the telephone - also they don't sell and
won't do the various things that they do for me for new customers).  Also,
the DUL rules (despite my even adding local checks) don't apply, because I
rbl DULs in Postfix far before anything hits SA;  In fact, while it is down
from what I was getting, Postfix still refuses about half of all connection
attempts for me, most due to bad rDNS.  Also, I see other people reporting
all kinds of numbers - I guess it depends on the type and mix of email a site
gets, but I find SA >99.5% effective (i.e. only one or two spams a week get
to mailboxes).  And I do take the time to "hand" train bayes with spam it
doesn't autolearn (but does catch), but which falls into certain categories
(e.g. stock pumps and viruses) which don't generate a high enough "header"
score to be autolearned.  Generally, except for the need for a dedicated or
at least powerful server and lots of memory (and Perl 5.8.x seems to need
more memory than 5.6.x did), I find SA quite amazing - but still it is only
at the third level of four levels of checks before I will deliver mail to a
mail box (there is still a virus checker afterward, though SA gets almost 80%
of the viruses itself).  And as has been brought up slightly on the list and
with a few people in private, as my confidence in SA has increased, my level
of "pre-filtering" has in some cases decreased.

        A quick check of plectere.com will show 4 MXs under my direct control
and despite having different priorities, from outside, they really map to 3
machines which are dynamically load balanced, and which I tend to think of as
a single unit (i.e. they are setup to share configs, merge logs, and generally
act "almost" like a cluster would);  My wording of 'back-up' was meant to be
only those machines not at my site (and behind my own firewalls) - also they
never pass mail to one another, only to a further internal MUA/MTA delivery
machine (i.e.  they "see" a different DNS than is published, with equal
priorities for all of them).

>
>Although 'unmarking' the next hop as trusted would prevent the dynamic 
>tests from firing on IMP mail, it would wreck havoc on the tests 
>mentioned above for all mail coming from remote networks.

        Would it?  It seems that the "notfirsthop" qualifier would do the
right thing for those cases. i.e. with the IMP machine untrusted, it would
look like any ISP's relay.  It seems that it would only be a problem if you
did not "believe" the authentication that IMP uses itself.

>
>Actually... setting trusted networks manually would fix Shane's problem 
>anyway, since the bug is (well, was) only in the inferral code.
>

        Another thing I do (and while I sure others do also, it is not the
common case), is I have separate servers for incoming and outgoing mail.  So
being paranoid, I don't even trust my own firewalls, who have to send the
nightly logs through the entire gamut of tests (now, my outgoing server and
the final MUA *do* (mostly) trust the incoming servers, but the incoming
servers don't trust anybody).

BTW. at first read, I saw "inferral" above as "infernal":)

>
>>      I can't see any possible reason why blanca.unet.brandeis.edu is a
>> trusted host for server.home.jay.fm;  But I can see many reasons why it 
>> should
>> not be.
>> 
>>      Also, by including the original post, you have done us all a service.
>> I see leakage of the literal 127.0.0.1 and evidence of a misconfigured DNS or
>> hosts file - i.e. the resolution of 127.0.0.1 to localhost.localdomain:  
>> While
>> the hostname "localhost" is part of several standards, the ".localdomain" 
>> part
>> is intended as an example only, is not legal and shows that there *do* exist
>> other administrative problems in his environment.
>
>'localhost.localdomain' is a RedHat default.  Why they ever did that I 
>don't know.
>
        I can say I'm glad I'm not a Linux user, but if I were, I would
probably choose SUSE or Debian - I spent too much time helping people fix
Redhat/Fedora installs (and their marketing, with different classes of
servers for paying vs. none-paying customers is a serious PITA).

>
>>      Simply, if you intend to setup a web mail interface, you need to "fix"
>> the other problems too (and probably first, before complaining about a bug).
>
>None of his other issues are actually related to the problem or the bug 
>that was present in the inferral code.

        Yea, I actually thought this thread had died.  My simple example
in the post after the one quoted here seem to show that it was related
entirely to "trust" (i.e. if I "trusted" the same machine(s) the rules didn't
fire, otherwise they did).

>
>
>Daryl
>
>

        Paul Shupak
        [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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