Hi Niek, Those patches apply cleanly, I do have some comments on the code.
I will try to answer on the public thread here instead of github, but for the next version try to send it with git send-email. It makes the whole review/test/apply process easier for me Thanks /Ilias On Thu, 22 Feb 2024 at 08:16, niek.nooij...@omron.com <niek.nooij...@omron.com> wrote: > > Hi Illias > > sure I pushed it here: > https://github.com/nieknooijens/u-boot/tree/tpm_policy_patch > > > Niek > > ________________________________ > 差出人: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodi...@linaro.org> > 送信日時: 2024年2月21日 18:01 > 宛先: Niek Nooijens / OC-IAB PBD-C DEVEL 1-1 <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > CC: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpen...@linaro.org>; u-boot@lists.denx.de > <u-boot@lists.denx.de> > 件名: Re: [PATCH] implement policy_pcr commands to lock NV-indexes behind a PCR > > [ilias.apalodi...@linaro.org > からのメールを受け取る頻度は高くありません。これが問題である可能性の理由については、https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification > をご覧ください。] > > Hi Niek, > > Thanks for the patch. The reason it's hard for us to apply it, is that > this patch seems copy-pasted on an email. > > Instead, you should follow the guidelines here [0]. Till you get this > sorted, do you have it on a git branch somewhere, so I can cherry-pick > it and run it through the CI? > > [0] > https://jpn01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.u-boot.org%2Fen%2Flatest%2Fdevelop%2Fsending_patches.html&data=05%7C02%7Cniek.nooijens%40omron.com%7Ccecf2d3ccfee492b819a08dc32bbd390%7C0ecff5a94bef4a7b96eca96579b4ac37%7C0%7C0%7C638441029505061036%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=UFTu5wiss76QRjy6rZxMRl43o90j%2BWn0UVrSPGRdaLU%3D&reserved=0 > > Thanks > /Ilias > > > On Wed, 21 Feb 2024 at 02:12, niek.nooij...@omron.com > <niek.nooij...@omron.com> wrote: > > > > Hi dan > > > > This might be because I used the checkpatch.pl script. > > Here's one without it. > > > > Niek > > > > =========================START PATCH ======================= > > From de056f510156a2fa1b4b439e1fa1f44516aa8add Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Niek Nooijens <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > > Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 13:42:57 +0900 > > Subject: [PATCH] [TPM] implement commands to lock NV-indexes behind a PCR > > policy > > > > Added commands are: > > - start auth session > > - flush context > > - policyPCR > > - getPolicyDigest > > > > Signed-off-by: Niek Nooijens <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > > --- > > cmd/tpm-v2.c | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > include/tpm-common.h | 2 + > > include/tpm-v2.h | 126 ++++++++++++--- > > lib/tpm-v2.c | 355 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > > lib/tpm_api.c | 4 +- > > 5 files changed, 669 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/cmd/tpm-v2.c b/cmd/tpm-v2.c > > index 7e479b9dfe..6b6f4629ea 100644 > > --- a/cmd/tpm-v2.c > > +++ b/cmd/tpm-v2.c > > @@ -356,6 +356,221 @@ static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue(struct cmd_tbl > > *cmdtp, int flag, > > key, key_sz)); > > } > > > > +static int do_tpm_nv_define(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > > + void *policy_addr = NULL; > > + size_t policy_size = 0; > > + int ret; > > + > > + u32 nv_attributes = TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE | TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE | > > TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD | TPMA_NV_PPWRITE | TPMA_NV_PPREAD; > > + > > + if (argc < 3 && argc > 7) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > + if (!priv) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > > + > > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > > + > > + if (argc > 3) > > + nv_attributes = simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0); > > + > > + if (argc > 4) { > > + policy_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > > + nv_attributes |= (TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD | TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE); > > //obligated, might as well force it > > + if (argc < 5) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + policy_size = simple_strtoul(argv[5], NULL, 0); > > + } > > + > > + rc = tpm2_nv_define_space(dev, nv_addr, nv_size, nv_attributes, > > policy_addr, policy_size); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: nv_define #%u returns: 0x%x\n", nv_addr, rc); > > + > > + if (policy_addr) > > + unmap_sysmem(policy_addr); > > + > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_tpm_nv_undefine(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 nv_addr, ret, rc; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + if (argc != 2) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > > + rc = tpm2_nv_undefine_space(dev, nv_addr); > > + > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_tpm_nv_read_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > > + void *session_addr = NULL; > > + int ret; > > + void *out_data; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + if (argc < 4) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > > + > > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > > + > > + out_data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + if (argc == 5) > > + session_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + rc = tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, nv_addr, out_data, nv_size, > > session_addr); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: nv_read #%u returns: #%u\n", nv_addr, rc); > > + > > + unmap_sysmem(out_data); > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_tpm_nv_write_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) //TODO: session handle from > > auth session! > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > > + void *session_addr = NULL; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + if (argc < 4) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); //tpm_addr > > + > > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); //size > > + > > + void *data_to_write = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + if (argc == 5) > > + session_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + rc = tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, nv_addr, data_to_write, nv_size, > > session_addr); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: nv_write #%u returns: #%u\n", nv_addr, rc); > > + > > + unmap_sysmem(session_addr); > > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_write); > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_start_auth_session(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 rc; > > + u8 session_type = TPM_SE_POLICY; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + > > + if (argc < 2) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + void *data_to_write = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + if (argc > 2) > > + session_type = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > > + > > + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(dev, data_to_write, session_type); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: start_auth_session returns: #%u\n", rc); > > + > > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_write); > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_flush_context(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 rc; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + > > + if (argc < 2) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + void *data_to_read = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > > + u32 session_handle = *((u32 *)data_to_read); > > + > > + rc = tpm2_flush_context(dev, session_handle); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: flush_context returns: #%u\n", rc); > > + > > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_read); > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > +static int do_policy_pcr(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 rc, pcr; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + > > + if (argc != 4) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > + > > + void *data_to_read = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > > + u32 session_handle = *((u32 *)data_to_read); > > + pcr = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > > + > > + void *out_digest = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > > + > > + rc = tpm2_set_policy_pcr(dev, session_handle, pcr, out_digest); > > + > > + if (rc) > > + printf("ERROR: policy_pcr returns: #%u\n", rc); > > + > > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_read); > > + unmap_sysmem(out_digest); > > + return report_return_code(rc); > > +} > > + > > static struct cmd_tbl tpm2_commands[] = { > > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(device, 0, 1, do_tpm_device, "", ""), > > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(info, 0, 1, do_tpm_info, "", ""), > > @@ -375,6 +590,13 @@ static struct cmd_tbl tpm2_commands[] = { > > do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy, "", ""), > > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthvalue, 0, 1, > > do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_define, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_define, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_undefine, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_undefine, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_read, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_read_value, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_write, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_write_value, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(start_auth_session, 0, 1, do_start_auth_session, "", > > ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(flush_context, 0, 1, do_flush_context, "", ""), > > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(policy_pcr, 0, 1, do_policy_pcr, "", ""), > > }; > > > > struct cmd_tbl *get_tpm2_commands(unsigned int *size) > > @@ -453,4 +675,40 @@ U_BOOT_CMD(tpm2, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue > > a TPMv2.x command", > > " <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" > > " <key>: secret to protect the access of PCR #<pcr>\n" > > " <password>: optional password of the PLATFORM hierarchy\n" > > +"\n" > > +"nv_define <tpm_addr> <size> [<attributes> <policy_digest_addr> > > <policy_size>]\n" > > +" Define new nv index in the TPM at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the > > NV-index\n" > > +" <attributes>: is described in tpm-v2.h enum tpm_index_attrs. Note; > > Always use TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE!\n" > > +" will default to: > > TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE|TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE|TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD|TPMA_NV_PPWRITE|TPMA_NV_PPREAD\n" > > +" <policy_digest_addr>: address to a policy digest. (e.g. a PCR > > value)\n" > > +" <policy_size>: size of the digest in bytes\n" > > +"nv_undefine <tpm_addr>\n" > > +" delete nv index\n" > > +"nv_read <tpm_addr> <size> <data_addr> [<session_handle_addr>]\n" > > +" Read data stored in TPM nv_memory at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the > > NV-index\n" > > +" <size>: datasize in bytes\n" > > +" <data_addr>: memory address where to store the data read from the > > TPM\n" > > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > > +"nv_write <tpm_addr> <size> <data_addr> [<session_handle_addr>]\n" > > +" Write data to the TPM's nv_memory at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the > > NV-index\n" > > +" <size>: datasize in bytes\n" > > +" <data_addr>: memory address of the data to be written to the TPM's > > NV-index\n" > > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > > +"start_auth_session <session_handle_addr> [<session_type>]\n" > > +" Start an authorization session and store it's handle at > > <session_handle_addr>\n" > > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where to store the handle data (4 > > bytes)\n" > > +" <session_type>: type of session: 0x00 for HMAC, 0x01 for policy, > > 0x03 for trial\n" > > +" will default to 0x01 (TPM_SE_POLICY) if not > > provided\n" > > +" to create a policy, use TPM_SE_TRIAL (0x03), to > > authenticate TPM_SE_POLICY (0x01)\n" > > +"flush_context <session_handle_addr>\n" > > +" flush/terminate a session which's handle is stored at > > <session_handle_addr>\n" > > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > > +"policy_pcr <session_handle_addr> <pcr> <digest_addr>\n" > > +" create a policy to authorize using a PCR\n" > > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > > +" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" > > +" <digest_addr>: addr where to store the policy digest (for > > nv_define/nv_read/write)\n" > > ); > > diff --git a/include/tpm-common.h b/include/tpm-common.h > > index 1ba81386ce..5620454da7 100644 > > --- a/include/tpm-common.h > > +++ b/include/tpm-common.h > > @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ struct tpm_chip_priv { > > uint pcr_count; > > uint pcr_select_min; > > bool plat_hier_disabled; > > + u16 nonce_sz; > > + u8 nonce[32]; //NONCE_TPM_SIZE; > > }; > > > > /** > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > index 33dd103767..5b60883777 100644 > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > @@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { > > */ > > enum tpm2_handles { > > TPM2_RH_OWNER = 0x40000001, > > - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, > > + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT = 0x4000000A, > > TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT = 0x4000000B, > > TPM2_RH_PLATFORM = 0x4000000C, > > @@ -325,24 +326,30 @@ enum tpm2_handles { > > * @TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL: TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue(). > > */ > > enum tpm2_command_codes { > > - TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, > > - TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, > > - TPM2_CC_HIER_CONTROL = 0x0121, > > - TPM2_CC_CLEAR = 0x0126, > > - TPM2_CC_CLEARCONTROL = 0x0127, > > - TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH = 0x0129, > > - TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE = 0x012a, > > - TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHPOL = 0x012C, > > - TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE = 0x0137, > > - TPM2_CC_NV_WRITELOCK = 0x0138, > > - TPM2_CC_DAM_RESET = 0x0139, > > - TPM2_CC_DAM_PARAMETERS = 0x013A, > > - TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, > > - TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, > > - TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, > > - TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, > > - TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, > > - TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL = 0x0183, > > + TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, > > + TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, > > + TPM2_CC_HIER_CONTROL = 0x0121, > > + TPM2_CC_CLEAR = 0x0126, > > + TPM2_CC_CLEARCONTROL = 0x0127, > > + TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH = 0x0129, > > + TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE = 0x012a, > > + TPM2_CC_NV_UNDEFINE_SPACE = 0x0122, > > + TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHPOL = 0x012C, > > + TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, > > + TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE = 0x0137, > > + TPM2_CC_NV_WRITELOCK = 0x0138, > > + TPM2_CC_DAM_RESET = 0x0139, > > + TPM2_CC_DAM_PARAMETERS = 0x013A, > > + TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, > > + TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, > > + TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION = 0x0176, > > + TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, > > + TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, > > + TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, > > + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F, > > + TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, > > + TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL = 0x0183, > > + TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST = 0x0189, > > }; > > > > /** > > @@ -384,6 +391,16 @@ enum tpm2_algorithms { > > TPM2_ALG_SHA512 = 0x0D, > > TPM2_ALG_NULL = 0x10, > > TPM2_ALG_SM3_256 = 0x12, > > + TPM2_ALG_ECC = 0x23, > > +}; > > + > > +/** > > + * TPM2 session types. > > + */ > > +enum tpm2_se { > > + TPM_SE_HMAC = 0x00, > > + TPM_SE_POLICY = 0x01, > > + TPM_SE_TRIAL = 0x03, > > }; > > > > extern const enum tpm2_algorithms tpm2_supported_algorithms[4]; > > @@ -700,6 +717,51 @@ u32 tpm2_self_test(struct udevice *dev, enum > > tpm2_yes_no full_test); > > u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const char *pw, > > const ssize_t pw_sz); > > > > +/** > > + * Issue a TPM2_StartAuthSession command. (chaining several commands > > together that need authorization) > > + * > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @session_handle Pointer to memory where to store the session handle. > > + * @session_type tpm2_se value to indicate session type (usually > > TPM_SE_POLICY) > > + * > > + * Return: code of the operation > > + */ > > +u32 tpm2_start_auth_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 *session_handle, u8 > > session_type); > > +/** > > + * Issue a TPM2_FlushContext command. (for ending the authorization > > session) > > + * > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @session_handle Authorization session to be terminated. > > + * > > + * Return: code of the operation > > + */ > > +u32 tpm2_flush_context(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle); > > + > > +/** > > + * Issue a TPM2_PolicyPCR command. (for authenticating using a PCR value) > > + * > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @session_handle policy session handle started with > > start_auth_session. > > + * @index Index of the PCR > > + * > > + * @note For now only 1 PCR selection is supported, > > + * since the value of one PCR can be extended with the value > > of another. > > + * This achieves the same effect as selecting multiple PCR's > > + * @out_digest addr where to write the digest > > + * Return: code of the operation > > + */ > > +u32 tpm2_set_policy_pcr(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, u32 > > index, void *out_digest); > > + > > +/** > > + * Issue a TPM2_getPolicyDigest command. > > + * > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @session_handle policy session handle started with > > start_auth_session. > > + * @out_digest addr where to write the digest (size is always 0x20 / > > TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) > > + * Return: code of the operation > > + */ > > +u32 tpm2_get_policy_digest(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, void > > *out_digest); > > + > > /** > > * Issue a TPM_NV_DefineSpace command > > * > > @@ -709,6 +771,7 @@ u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const > > char *pw, > > * @space_index index of the area > > * @space_size size of area in bytes > > * @nv_attributes TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES of the area > > + * @session_handle handle to a session. can be TPM2_RS_PW > > * @nv_policy policy to use > > * @nv_policy_size size of the policy > > * Return: return code of the operation > > @@ -717,6 +780,17 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > > space_index, > > size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > > const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size); > > > > +/** > > + * Issue a TPM_NV_UnDefineSpace command > > + * > > + * This allows a space to be removed. Needed because TPM_clear doesn't > > clear platform entries > > + * > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @space_index index of the area > > + * Return: return code of the operation > > + */ > > +u32 tpm2_nv_undefine_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index); > > + > > /** > > * Issue a TPM2_PCR_Extend command. > > * > > @@ -734,13 +808,14 @@ u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > > u32 algorithm, > > /** > > * Read data from the secure storage > > * > > - * @dev TPM device > > - * @index Index of data to read > > - * @data Place to put data > > - * @count Number of bytes of data > > + * @dev TPM device > > + * @index Index of data to read > > + * @data Place to put data > > + * @count Number of bytes of data > > + * @session_handle handle of a running authorization session. if > > NULL->password authorization > > * Return: code of the operation > > */ > > -u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > > count); > > +u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > > count, u32 *session_handle); > > > > /** > > * Write data to the secure storage > > @@ -749,10 +824,11 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 > > index, void *data, u32 count); > > * @index Index of data to write > > * @data Data to write > > * @count Number of bytes of data > > + * @session_handle handle of a running authorization session. if > > NULL->password authorization > > * Return: code of the operation > > */ > > u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *data, > > - u32 count); > > + u32 count, u32 *session_handle); > > > > /** > > * Issue a TPM2_PCR_Read command. > > diff --git a/lib/tpm-v2.c b/lib/tpm-v2.c > > index 68eaaa639f..3d5e4e8343 100644 > > --- a/lib/tpm-v2.c > > +++ b/lib/tpm-v2.c > > @@ -786,19 +786,192 @@ u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, > > const char *pw, > > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > } > > > > +u32 tpm2_start_auth_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 *session_handle, u8 > > session_type) > > +{ > > + const u16 nonce_size = TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; > > + const int handles_len = sizeof(u32) * 2; > > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + handles_len + 2; > > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > > + > > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > + if (!priv) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > + tpm_u32(offset + nonce_size + 7),/* Length */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION),/* Command code */ > > + > > + /* handles 8 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_NULL), /* TPMI_DH_OBJECT+ */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_NULL), /* TPMI_DH_ENTITY+ */ > > + > > + /* NONCE 32 bytes -> use pack_byte_string() */ > > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), > > + /* message 7 bytes -> use pack_byte_string() */ > > + //tpm_u16(0), // salt size > > + //session_type, // session type > > + //tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_NULL), // symmetric key algorythm > > + //tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), // auth hash > > + }; > > + u8 Nonce[nonce_size]; //nonce is a random number you use once. (Number > > ONCE) > > + memset(&Nonce, 2, nonce_size); //should use TPM_get_random() to > > randomize > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "swbww", > > + offset, Nonce, nonce_size, > > + offset + nonce_size, 0, //salt size > > + offset + nonce_size + 2, session_type, > > + offset + nonce_size + 3, TPM2_ALG_NULL, > > + offset + nonce_size + 5, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); > > + > > + if (ret) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > > + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > > + u16 tag; > > + u32 size, code; > > + > > + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > > + > > + if (ret) > > + return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > > + > > + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdddws", > > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, //header > > + 10, session_handle, //TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION > > + 14, &priv->nonce_sz, > > + 16, priv->nonce, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) //HACK: we > > asked for a SHA256, so that's what we'll get. if ret == 0 at least > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > +u32 tpm2_flush_context(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle) > > +{ > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_HDR_LEN + sizeof(u32)),/* Length */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT),/* Command code */ > > + > > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_DH_CONTEXT+ */ > > + }; > > + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > +} > > + > > +u32 tpm2_set_policy_pcr(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, u32 > > index, void *out_digest) > > +{ > > + const int offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 6; > > + const int message_len = offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 10; > > + > > + u8 pcr_sel_bit = BIT(index % 8); > > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > > + > > + digest_list.count = 1; > > + digest_list.digests->hash_alg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256; > > + tcg2_pcr_read(dev, index, &digest_list); > > + > > + u8 pcr_sha_output[TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + sha256_context ctx_256; > > + > > + sha256_starts(&ctx_256); > > + sha256_update(&ctx_256, digest_list.digests[0].digest.sha256, > > TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); > > + sha256_finish(&ctx_256, pcr_sha_output); > > + > > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > + if (!priv) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + u8 idx_array_sz = max(priv->pcr_select_min, DIV_ROUND_UP(index, 8)); > > + > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG -> TPM2_ST_SESSIONS > > only for audit or decrypt*/ > > + tpm_u32(message_len),/* Length */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR),/* Command code */ > > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_SH_POLICY */ > > + /* PCR Digest - 32 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) /*hash size*/ > > + /* digest - 32-bytes */ > > + /* PCR selection */ > > + //tpm_u32(1), /* Number of selections */ > > + //tpm_u16(TPM_ALG_SHA256), /* Algorithm of the > > hash */ > > + //idx_array_sz, /* Array size for selection > > */ > > + /* bitmap(idx) Selected PCR bitmap */ > > + }; > > + > > + if (pack_byte_string(command_v2, COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE, "sdwbbw", > > + offset, pcr_sha_output, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, > > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 1, /* Number of > > selections */ > > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 4, TPM2_ALG_SHA256, /* > > Algorithm of the hash */ > > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 6, idx_array_sz, /* > > Array size for selection */ > > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 7, pcr_sel_bit,/* > > Selected PCR bitmap */ > > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 8, 0)) /*padding */ > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + int ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > + > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + > > + return tpm2_get_policy_digest(dev, session_handle, out_digest); > > +} > > + > > +u32 tpm2_get_policy_digest(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, void > > *out_digest) > > +{ > > + const int message_len = TPM2_HDR_LEN + sizeof(u32); > > + > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG -> only audit or > > decrypt session uses TPM2_ST_SESSIONS */ > > + tpm_u32(message_len),/* Length */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST),/* Command code */ > > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_SH_POLICY */ > > + }; > > + > > + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > > + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > > + int ret; > > + u16 tag; > > + u32 size, code; > > + > > + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > > + if (ret) > > + return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > > + > > + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdds", > > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > > + 12, out_digest, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) //digest_size > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index, > > - size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > > - const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) > > + size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > > + const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) > > { > > /* > > * Calculate the offset of the nv_policy piece by adding each of the > > * chunks below. > > */ > > const int platform_len = sizeof(u32); > > - const int session_hdr_len = 13; > > + const int session_hdr_len = 15; > > const int message_len = 14; > > - uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > > - message_len; > > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > > message_len; > > + u8 attrs = 0; > > + > > + //if(session_handle != TPM2_RS_PW) > > + //attrs = 1; //continue_session (bit 1) > > + > > u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > /* header 10 bytes */ > > tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > @@ -806,20 +979,24 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > > space_index, > > tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE),/* Command code */ > > > > /* handles 4 bytes */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed, > > requires TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE*/ > > + > > > > - /* session header 13 bytes */ > > + /* session header 15 bytes */ > > + /*null auth session*/ > > tpm_u32(9), /* Header size */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Password authorisation */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW),/* auth session handle if it's active, > > otherwise TPM2_RS_PW*/ > > tpm_u16(0), /* nonce_size */ > > - 0, /* session_attrs */ > > + attrs, /* session_attrs */ > > + tpm_u16(0), /* HMAC size */ > > + /*end auth area*/ > > tpm_u16(0), /* auth_size */ > > > > /* message 14 bytes + policy */ > > tpm_u16(message_len + nv_policy_size), /* size */ > > tpm_u32(space_index), > > tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), > > - tpm_u32(nv_attributes), > > + tpm_u32(nv_attributes | TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE), > > tpm_u16(nv_policy_size), > > /* > > * nv_policy > > @@ -841,6 +1018,35 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > > space_index, > > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > } > > > > +u32 tpm2_nv_undefine_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index) > > +{ > > + const int platform_len = sizeof(u32); > > + const int session_hdr_len = 13; > > + const int message_len = 4; > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > > + message_len),/* Length - header + provision + index > > + auth area*/ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_UNDEFINE_SPACE),/* Command code */ > > + > > + /* handles 4 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > > + /* nv_index */ > > + tpm_u32(space_index), > > + > > + /*null auth session*/ > > + tpm_u32(9), /* Header size */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Password authorisation*/ > > + tpm_u16(0), /* nonce_size */ > > + 0, /* session_attrs */ > > + tpm_u16(0), /* HMAC size */ > > + /*end auth area*/ > > + > > + }; > > + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > +} > > + > > u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, u32 algorithm, > > const u8 *digest, u32 digest_len) > > { > > @@ -884,56 +1090,99 @@ u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > > u32 algorithm, > > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > > } > > > > -u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > > count) > > +u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > > count, u32 *session_handle) > > { > > - u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > - /* header 10 bytes */ > > - tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > - tpm_u32(10 + 8 + 4 + 9 + 4), /* Length */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_READ), /* Command code */ > > + u32 offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 8 + 4 + 6; > > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > > > > - /* handles 8 bytes */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > > - tpm_u32(HR_NV_INDEX + index), /* Password authorisation */ > > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > > > - /* AUTH_SESSION */ > > - tpm_u32(9), /* Authorization size */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ > > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ > > - /* <nonce> (if any) */ > > - 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > > - /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > > + if (!priv) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + u32 nonce_size = priv->nonce_sz; > > + priv->nonce[nonce_size - 1]++; //increase nonce. > > + > > + u32 authorization = TPM2_RS_PW; > > > > - tpm_u16(count), /* Number of bytes */ > > - tpm_u16(0), /* Offset */ > > + if (session_handle) > > + authorization = *session_handle; > > + else > > + nonce_size = 0; //cannot use nonce when using password > > authorization > > + > > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > + /* header 10 bytes */ > > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > + tpm_u32(offset + nonce_size + 7), /* Length */ > > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_READ), /* Command code */ > > + > > + /* handles 8 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(index), /* Primary platform seed */ > > + tpm_u32(index), /*nv index*/ > > + > > + /* AUTH_SESSION */ > > + tpm_u32(9 + nonce_size), /* > > Authorization size - 4 bytes*/ > > + /*auth handle - 9 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(authorization), > > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), /* Size of <nonce> */ > > + /* <nonce> (if any) */ > > + //0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> > > */ > > + /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > > + /*end auth handle */ > > + //tpm_u16(count), /* Number of bytes */ > > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Offset */ > > }; > > + > > size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > > u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > > int ret; > > u16 tag; > > u32 size, code; > > > > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sbwww", > > + offset, priv->nonce, nonce_size, > > + offset + nonce_size, 0, > > + offset + nonce_size + 1, 0, > > + offset + nonce_size + 3, count, > > + offset + nonce_size + 5, 0); > > + > > + if (ret) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > > if (ret) > > return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > > + > > if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdds", > > - 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > > - 16, data, count)) > > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > > + 16, data, count)) > > return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > > > return 0; > > } > > > > u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *data, > > - u32 count) > > + u32 count, u32 *session_handle) > > { > > struct tpm_chip_priv *priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > - uint offset = 10 + 8 + 4 + 9 + 2; > > - uint len = offset + count + 2; > > - /* Use empty password auth if platform hierarchy is disabled */ > > - u32 auth = priv->plat_hier_disabled ? HR_NV_INDEX + index : > > - TPM2_RH_PLATFORM; > > + > > + if (!priv) > > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > + > > + u32 nonce_size = priv->nonce_sz; > > + priv->nonce[nonce_size - 1]++; > > + > > + u32 authorization = TPM2_RS_PW; > > + > > + if (session_handle != NULL) > > + authorization = *session_handle; > > + else > > + nonce_size = 0; //cannot use nonce when using password > > authorization > > + > > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 8 + 4 + 6; > > + uint len = offset + nonce_size + count + 7; > > + > > u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > > /* header 10 bytes */ > > tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > > @@ -941,27 +1190,35 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 > > index, const void *data, > > tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE), /* Command code */ > > > > /* handles 8 bytes */ > > - tpm_u32(auth), /* Primary platform seed */ > > - tpm_u32(HR_NV_INDEX + index), /* Password authorisation */ > > + tpm_u32(index), /* Primary platform seed */ > > + tpm_u32(index), /*nv index*/ > > > > /* AUTH_SESSION */ > > - tpm_u32(9), /* Authorization size */ > > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ > > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ > > + tpm_u32(9 + nonce_size), /* Authorization size > > - 4 bytes */ > > + /*auth handle - 9 bytes */ > > + tpm_u32(authorization), > > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), /* Size of <nonce> */ > > /* <nonce> (if any) */ > > - 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > > + //0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > > /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > > - > > - tpm_u16(count), > > + /*end auth handle */ > > + //tpm_u16(count),/*size of buffer - 2 bytes*/ > > + /*data (buffer)*/ > > + /*offset -> the octet offset into the NV Area*/ > > }; > > size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > > u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > > int ret; > > > > - ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sw", > > - offset, data, count, > > - offset + count, 0); > > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sbwwsw", > > + offset, priv->nonce, nonce_size, > > + offset + nonce_size, 0, //attrs > > + offset + nonce_size +1, 0, //hmac sz > > + offset + nonce_size + 3, count, > > + offset + nonce_size + 5, data, count, > > + offset + nonce_size + count, 0); > > + > > if (ret) > > return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > > > diff --git a/lib/tpm_api.c b/lib/tpm_api.c > > index 39a5121e30..5875e7b085 100644 > > --- a/lib/tpm_api.c > > +++ b/lib/tpm_api.c > > @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ u32 tpm_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > > void *data, u32 count) > > if (tpm_is_v1(dev)) > > return tpm1_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count); > > else if (tpm_is_v2(dev)) > > - return tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count); > > + return tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count, NULL); > > else > > return -ENOSYS; > > } > > @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ u32 tpm_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > > const void *data, > > if (tpm_is_v1(dev)) > > return tpm1_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count); > > else if (tpm_is_v2(dev)) > > - return tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count); > > + return tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count, NULL); > > else > > return -ENOSYS; > > } > > -- > > 2.34.1 > > ====================END PATCH============================ > > ________________________________ > > 差出人: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpen...@linaro.org> > > 送信日時: 2024年2月21日 02:56 > > 宛先: Niek Nooijens / OC-IAB PBD-C DEVEL 1-1 <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > > CC: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodi...@linaro.org>; u-boot@lists.denx.de > > <u-boot@lists.denx.de> > > 件名: Re: [PATCH] implement policy_pcr commands to lock NV-indexes behind a > > PCR > > > > [dan.carpen...@linaro.org > > からのメールを受け取る頻度は高くありません。これが問題である可能性の理由については、https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification > > をご覧ください。] > > > > I'm kind of new to u-boot and I'm not really able to review this code > > as well as I should. > > > > But also I can't apply the patch. It seems white space damaged? The > > kernel has a good document on how to do this. I'm pretty sure u-boot > > does as well but I'm new. > > https://jpn01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kernel.org%2Fdoc%2FDocumentation%2Fprocess%2Femail-clients.rst&data=05%7C02%7Cniek.nooijens%40omron.com%7Ccecf2d3ccfee492b819a08dc32bbd390%7C0ecff5a94bef4a7b96eca96579b4ac37%7C0%7C0%7C638441029505074060%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=AGVulkGYczDB1uPfXOFptjNJgqOkgsOQssE4j6ZGsOk%3D&reserved=0 > > > > Please run your patch through the scripts/checkpatch.pl script. Stuff > > like this triggers a warning: > > > > > +static int do_tpm_nv_write_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) //TODO: session > > > handle from auth session! > > > +{ > > > + struct udevice *dev; > > > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > > > + void *session_addr = NULL; > > > + int ret; > > > + > > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > > + if (ret) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + if (argc < 4) > > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > > > > > WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (0, 0) > > #250: FILE: cmd/tpm-v2.c:437: > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > > > WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (0, 0) > > #253: FILE: cmd/tpm-v2.c:440: > > + if (argc < 4) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > > > Also the subject should have a subsystem prefix and the information from > > the email should be moved into the commit message. Currently the commit > > message is empty. > > > > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > > index 33dd103767..5b60883777 100644 > > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > > @@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { > > > */ > > > enum tpm2_handles { > > > TPM2_RH_OWNER = 0x40000001, > > > - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > > + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, > > > + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > > > Changing TPM2_RS_PW is an unrelated whitespace change. Do that as a > > separate patch. But I don't get it at all because the TPM2_RS_PW enum > > has always been indented correctly as far as I can see. So it's a > > puzzle. > > > > I mean there are a lot of TODOs and I understand that you just wanted a > > high level review but I kept getting distracted and lost and I couldn't > > apply the patch so it was just really hard to figure out what was going > > on. :( > > > > regards, > > dan carpenter > >
