Hi Niek, Thanks for the patch. The reason it's hard for us to apply it, is that this patch seems copy-pasted on an email.
Instead, you should follow the guidelines here [0]. Till you get this sorted, do you have it on a git branch somewhere, so I can cherry-pick it and run it through the CI? [0] https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/develop/sending_patches.html Thanks /Ilias On Wed, 21 Feb 2024 at 02:12, niek.nooij...@omron.com <niek.nooij...@omron.com> wrote: > > Hi dan > > This might be because I used the checkpatch.pl script. > Here's one without it. > > Niek > > =========================START PATCH ======================= > From de056f510156a2fa1b4b439e1fa1f44516aa8add Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Niek Nooijens <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 13:42:57 +0900 > Subject: [PATCH] [TPM] implement commands to lock NV-indexes behind a PCR > policy > > Added commands are: > - start auth session > - flush context > - policyPCR > - getPolicyDigest > > Signed-off-by: Niek Nooijens <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > --- > cmd/tpm-v2.c | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/tpm-common.h | 2 + > include/tpm-v2.h | 126 ++++++++++++--- > lib/tpm-v2.c | 355 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > lib/tpm_api.c | 4 +- > 5 files changed, 669 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/cmd/tpm-v2.c b/cmd/tpm-v2.c > index 7e479b9dfe..6b6f4629ea 100644 > --- a/cmd/tpm-v2.c > +++ b/cmd/tpm-v2.c > @@ -356,6 +356,221 @@ static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue(struct cmd_tbl > *cmdtp, int flag, > key, key_sz)); > } > > +static int do_tpm_nv_define(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > + void *policy_addr = NULL; > + size_t policy_size = 0; > + int ret; > + > + u32 nv_attributes = TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE | TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE | > TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD | TPMA_NV_PPWRITE | TPMA_NV_PPREAD; > + > + if (argc < 3 && argc > 7) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > + if (!priv) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > + > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > + > + if (argc > 3) > + nv_attributes = simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0); > + > + if (argc > 4) { > + policy_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > + nv_attributes |= (TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD | TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE); > //obligated, might as well force it > + if (argc < 5) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + policy_size = simple_strtoul(argv[5], NULL, 0); > + } > + > + rc = tpm2_nv_define_space(dev, nv_addr, nv_size, nv_attributes, > policy_addr, policy_size); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: nv_define #%u returns: 0x%x\n", nv_addr, rc); > + > + if (policy_addr) > + unmap_sysmem(policy_addr); > + > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_tpm_nv_undefine(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 nv_addr, ret, rc; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + if (argc != 2) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > + rc = tpm2_nv_undefine_space(dev, nv_addr); > + > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_tpm_nv_read_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > + int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > + void *session_addr = NULL; > + int ret; > + void *out_data; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + if (argc < 4) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); > + > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > + > + out_data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + if (argc == 5) > + session_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + rc = tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, nv_addr, out_data, nv_size, session_addr); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: nv_read #%u returns: #%u\n", nv_addr, rc); > + > + unmap_sysmem(out_data); > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_tpm_nv_write_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > + int argc, char *const argv[]) //TODO: session handle from auth > session! > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > + void *session_addr = NULL; > + int ret; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + if (argc < 4) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + nv_addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); //tpm_addr > + > + nv_size = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); //size > + > + void *data_to_write = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + if (argc == 5) > + session_addr = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + rc = tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, nv_addr, data_to_write, nv_size, > session_addr); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: nv_write #%u returns: #%u\n", nv_addr, rc); > + > + unmap_sysmem(session_addr); > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_write); > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_start_auth_session(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 rc; > + u8 session_type = TPM_SE_POLICY; > + int ret; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + > + if (argc < 2) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + void *data_to_write = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + if (argc > 2) > + session_type = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > + > + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(dev, data_to_write, session_type); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: start_auth_session returns: #%u\n", rc); > + > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_write); > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_flush_context(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 rc; > + int ret; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + > + if (argc < 2) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + void *data_to_read = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > + u32 session_handle = *((u32 *)data_to_read); > + > + rc = tpm2_flush_context(dev, session_handle); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: flush_context returns: #%u\n", rc); > + > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_read); > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > +static int do_policy_pcr(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > +int argc, char *const argv[]) > +{ > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 rc, pcr; > + int ret; > + > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > + > + if (argc != 4) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > + > + void *data_to_read = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0), 0); > + u32 session_handle = *((u32 *)data_to_read); > + pcr = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); > + > + void *out_digest = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); > + > + rc = tpm2_set_policy_pcr(dev, session_handle, pcr, out_digest); > + > + if (rc) > + printf("ERROR: policy_pcr returns: #%u\n", rc); > + > + unmap_sysmem(data_to_read); > + unmap_sysmem(out_digest); > + return report_return_code(rc); > +} > + > static struct cmd_tbl tpm2_commands[] = { > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(device, 0, 1, do_tpm_device, "", ""), > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(info, 0, 1, do_tpm_info, "", ""), > @@ -375,6 +590,13 @@ static struct cmd_tbl tpm2_commands[] = { > do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy, "", ""), > U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthvalue, 0, 1, > do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_define, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_define, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_undefine, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_undefine, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_read, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_read_value, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(nv_write, 0, 1, do_tpm_nv_write_value, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(start_auth_session, 0, 1, do_start_auth_session, "", > ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(flush_context, 0, 1, do_flush_context, "", ""), > + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(policy_pcr, 0, 1, do_policy_pcr, "", ""), > }; > > struct cmd_tbl *get_tpm2_commands(unsigned int *size) > @@ -453,4 +675,40 @@ U_BOOT_CMD(tpm2, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue a > TPMv2.x command", > " <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" > " <key>: secret to protect the access of PCR #<pcr>\n" > " <password>: optional password of the PLATFORM hierarchy\n" > +"\n" > +"nv_define <tpm_addr> <size> [<attributes> <policy_digest_addr> > <policy_size>]\n" > +" Define new nv index in the TPM at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the NV-index\n" > +" <attributes>: is described in tpm-v2.h enum tpm_index_attrs. Note; > Always use TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE!\n" > +" will default to: > TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE|TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE|TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD|TPMA_NV_PPWRITE|TPMA_NV_PPREAD\n" > +" <policy_digest_addr>: address to a policy digest. (e.g. a PCR value)\n" > +" <policy_size>: size of the digest in bytes\n" > +"nv_undefine <tpm_addr>\n" > +" delete nv index\n" > +"nv_read <tpm_addr> <size> <data_addr> [<session_handle_addr>]\n" > +" Read data stored in TPM nv_memory at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the NV-index\n" > +" <size>: datasize in bytes\n" > +" <data_addr>: memory address where to store the data read from the TPM\n" > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > +"nv_write <tpm_addr> <size> <data_addr> [<session_handle_addr>]\n" > +" Write data to the TPM's nv_memory at <tpm_addr> with size <size>\n" > +" <tpm_addr>: the internal address used within the TPM for the NV-index\n" > +" <size>: datasize in bytes\n" > +" <data_addr>: memory address of the data to be written to the TPM's > NV-index\n" > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > +"start_auth_session <session_handle_addr> [<session_type>]\n" > +" Start an authorization session and store it's handle at > <session_handle_addr>\n" > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where to store the handle data (4 bytes)\n" > +" <session_type>: type of session: 0x00 for HMAC, 0x01 for policy, 0x03 > for trial\n" > +" will default to 0x01 (TPM_SE_POLICY) if not provided\n" > +" to create a policy, use TPM_SE_TRIAL (0x03), to > authenticate TPM_SE_POLICY (0x01)\n" > +"flush_context <session_handle_addr>\n" > +" flush/terminate a session which's handle is stored at > <session_handle_addr>\n" > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > +"policy_pcr <session_handle_addr> <pcr> <digest_addr>\n" > +" create a policy to authorize using a PCR\n" > +" <session_handle_addr>: addr where the session handle is stored\n" > +" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" > +" <digest_addr>: addr where to store the policy digest (for > nv_define/nv_read/write)\n" > ); > diff --git a/include/tpm-common.h b/include/tpm-common.h > index 1ba81386ce..5620454da7 100644 > --- a/include/tpm-common.h > +++ b/include/tpm-common.h > @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ struct tpm_chip_priv { > uint pcr_count; > uint pcr_select_min; > bool plat_hier_disabled; > + u16 nonce_sz; > + u8 nonce[32]; //NONCE_TPM_SIZE; > }; > > /** > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > index 33dd103767..5b60883777 100644 > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > @@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { > */ > enum tpm2_handles { > TPM2_RH_OWNER = 0x40000001, > - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, > + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT = 0x4000000A, > TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT = 0x4000000B, > TPM2_RH_PLATFORM = 0x4000000C, > @@ -325,24 +326,30 @@ enum tpm2_handles { > * @TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL: TPM2_PCR_SetAuthValue(). > */ > enum tpm2_command_codes { > - TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, > - TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, > - TPM2_CC_HIER_CONTROL = 0x0121, > - TPM2_CC_CLEAR = 0x0126, > - TPM2_CC_CLEARCONTROL = 0x0127, > - TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH = 0x0129, > - TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE = 0x012a, > - TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHPOL = 0x012C, > - TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE = 0x0137, > - TPM2_CC_NV_WRITELOCK = 0x0138, > - TPM2_CC_DAM_RESET = 0x0139, > - TPM2_CC_DAM_PARAMETERS = 0x013A, > - TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, > - TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, > - TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, > - TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, > - TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, > - TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL = 0x0183, > + TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, > + TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, > + TPM2_CC_HIER_CONTROL = 0x0121, > + TPM2_CC_CLEAR = 0x0126, > + TPM2_CC_CLEARCONTROL = 0x0127, > + TPM2_CC_HIERCHANGEAUTH = 0x0129, > + TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE = 0x012a, > + TPM2_CC_NV_UNDEFINE_SPACE = 0x0122, > + TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHPOL = 0x012C, > + TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, > + TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE = 0x0137, > + TPM2_CC_NV_WRITELOCK = 0x0138, > + TPM2_CC_DAM_RESET = 0x0139, > + TPM2_CC_DAM_PARAMETERS = 0x013A, > + TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, > + TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, > + TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION = 0x0176, > + TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, > + TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, > + TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, > + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR = 0x017F, > + TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, > + TPM2_CC_PCR_SETAUTHVAL = 0x0183, > + TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST = 0x0189, > }; > > /** > @@ -384,6 +391,16 @@ enum tpm2_algorithms { > TPM2_ALG_SHA512 = 0x0D, > TPM2_ALG_NULL = 0x10, > TPM2_ALG_SM3_256 = 0x12, > + TPM2_ALG_ECC = 0x23, > +}; > + > +/** > + * TPM2 session types. > + */ > +enum tpm2_se { > + TPM_SE_HMAC = 0x00, > + TPM_SE_POLICY = 0x01, > + TPM_SE_TRIAL = 0x03, > }; > > extern const enum tpm2_algorithms tpm2_supported_algorithms[4]; > @@ -700,6 +717,51 @@ u32 tpm2_self_test(struct udevice *dev, enum tpm2_yes_no > full_test); > u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const char *pw, > const ssize_t pw_sz); > > +/** > + * Issue a TPM2_StartAuthSession command. (chaining several commands > together that need authorization) > + * > + * @dev TPM device > + * @session_handle Pointer to memory where to store the session handle. > + * @session_type tpm2_se value to indicate session type (usually > TPM_SE_POLICY) > + * > + * Return: code of the operation > + */ > +u32 tpm2_start_auth_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 *session_handle, u8 > session_type); > +/** > + * Issue a TPM2_FlushContext command. (for ending the authorization session) > + * > + * @dev TPM device > + * @session_handle Authorization session to be terminated. > + * > + * Return: code of the operation > + */ > +u32 tpm2_flush_context(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle); > + > +/** > + * Issue a TPM2_PolicyPCR command. (for authenticating using a PCR value) > + * > + * @dev TPM device > + * @session_handle policy session handle started with start_auth_session. > + * @index Index of the PCR > + * > + * @note For now only 1 PCR selection is supported, > + * since the value of one PCR can be extended with the value > of another. > + * This achieves the same effect as selecting multiple PCR's > + * @out_digest addr where to write the digest > + * Return: code of the operation > + */ > +u32 tpm2_set_policy_pcr(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, u32 index, > void *out_digest); > + > +/** > + * Issue a TPM2_getPolicyDigest command. > + * > + * @dev TPM device > + * @session_handle policy session handle started with start_auth_session. > + * @out_digest addr where to write the digest (size is always 0x20 / > TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) > + * Return: code of the operation > + */ > +u32 tpm2_get_policy_digest(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, void > *out_digest); > + > /** > * Issue a TPM_NV_DefineSpace command > * > @@ -709,6 +771,7 @@ u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const > char *pw, > * @space_index index of the area > * @space_size size of area in bytes > * @nv_attributes TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES of the area > + * @session_handle handle to a session. can be TPM2_RS_PW > * @nv_policy policy to use > * @nv_policy_size size of the policy > * Return: return code of the operation > @@ -717,6 +780,17 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > space_index, > size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size); > > +/** > + * Issue a TPM_NV_UnDefineSpace command > + * > + * This allows a space to be removed. Needed because TPM_clear doesn't clear > platform entries > + * > + * @dev TPM device > + * @space_index index of the area > + * Return: return code of the operation > + */ > +u32 tpm2_nv_undefine_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index); > + > /** > * Issue a TPM2_PCR_Extend command. > * > @@ -734,13 +808,14 @@ u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, u32 > algorithm, > /** > * Read data from the secure storage > * > - * @dev TPM device > - * @index Index of data to read > - * @data Place to put data > - * @count Number of bytes of data > + * @dev TPM device > + * @index Index of data to read > + * @data Place to put data > + * @count Number of bytes of data > + * @session_handle handle of a running authorization session. if > NULL->password authorization > * Return: code of the operation > */ > -u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > count); > +u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > count, u32 *session_handle); > > /** > * Write data to the secure storage > @@ -749,10 +824,11 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > void *data, u32 count); > * @index Index of data to write > * @data Data to write > * @count Number of bytes of data > + * @session_handle handle of a running authorization session. if > NULL->password authorization > * Return: code of the operation > */ > u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *data, > - u32 count); > + u32 count, u32 *session_handle); > > /** > * Issue a TPM2_PCR_Read command. > diff --git a/lib/tpm-v2.c b/lib/tpm-v2.c > index 68eaaa639f..3d5e4e8343 100644 > --- a/lib/tpm-v2.c > +++ b/lib/tpm-v2.c > @@ -786,19 +786,192 @@ u32 tpm2_clear(struct udevice *dev, u32 handle, const > char *pw, > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > } > > +u32 tpm2_start_auth_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 *session_handle, u8 > session_type) > +{ > + const u16 nonce_size = TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; > + const int handles_len = sizeof(u32) * 2; > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + handles_len + 2; > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > + > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > + if (!priv) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > + tpm_u32(offset + nonce_size + 7),/* Length */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESSION),/* Command code */ > + > + /* handles 8 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_NULL), /* TPMI_DH_OBJECT+ */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_NULL), /* TPMI_DH_ENTITY+ */ > + > + /* NONCE 32 bytes -> use pack_byte_string() */ > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), > + /* message 7 bytes -> use pack_byte_string() */ > + //tpm_u16(0), // salt size > + //session_type, // session type > + //tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_NULL), // symmetric key algorythm > + //tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), // auth hash > + }; > + u8 Nonce[nonce_size]; //nonce is a random number you use once. (Number > ONCE) > + memset(&Nonce, 2, nonce_size); //should use TPM_get_random() to randomize > + int ret; > + > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "swbww", > + offset, Nonce, nonce_size, > + offset + nonce_size, 0, //salt size > + offset + nonce_size + 2, session_type, > + offset + nonce_size + 3, TPM2_ALG_NULL, > + offset + nonce_size + 5, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); > + > + if (ret) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > + u16 tag; > + u32 size, code; > + > + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > + > + if (ret) > + return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > + > + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdddws", > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, //header > + 10, session_handle, //TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION > + 14, &priv->nonce_sz, > + 16, priv->nonce, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) //HACK: we asked > for a SHA256, so that's what we'll get. if ret == 0 at least > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +u32 tpm2_flush_context(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle) > +{ > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_HDR_LEN + sizeof(u32)),/* Length */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT),/* Command code */ > + > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_DH_CONTEXT+ */ > + }; > + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > +} > + > +u32 tpm2_set_policy_pcr(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, u32 index, > void *out_digest) > +{ > + const int offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 6; > + const int message_len = offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 10; > + > + u8 pcr_sel_bit = BIT(index % 8); > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > + > + digest_list.count = 1; > + digest_list.digests->hash_alg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256; > + tcg2_pcr_read(dev, index, &digest_list); > + > + u8 pcr_sha_output[TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + sha256_context ctx_256; > + > + sha256_starts(&ctx_256); > + sha256_update(&ctx_256, digest_list.digests[0].digest.sha256, > TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); > + sha256_finish(&ctx_256, pcr_sha_output); > + > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > + if (!priv) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + u8 idx_array_sz = max(priv->pcr_select_min, DIV_ROUND_UP(index, 8)); > + > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG -> TPM2_ST_SESSIONS > only for audit or decrypt*/ > + tpm_u32(message_len),/* Length */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_POLICY_PCR),/* Command code */ > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_SH_POLICY */ > + /* PCR Digest - 32 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) /*hash size*/ > + /* digest - 32-bytes */ > + /* PCR selection */ > + //tpm_u32(1), /* Number of selections */ > + //tpm_u16(TPM_ALG_SHA256), /* Algorithm of the > hash */ > + //idx_array_sz, /* Array size for selection */ > + /* bitmap(idx) Selected PCR bitmap */ > + }; > + > + if (pack_byte_string(command_v2, COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE, "sdwbbw", > + offset, pcr_sha_output, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 1, /* Number of > selections */ > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 4, TPM2_ALG_SHA256, /* > Algorithm of the hash */ > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 6, idx_array_sz, /* > Array size for selection */ > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 7, pcr_sel_bit,/* > Selected PCR bitmap */ > + offset + TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 8, 0)) /*padding */ > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + int ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > + > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + > + return tpm2_get_policy_digest(dev, session_handle, out_digest); > +} > + > +u32 tpm2_get_policy_digest(struct udevice *dev, u32 session_handle, void > *out_digest) > +{ > + const int message_len = TPM2_HDR_LEN + sizeof(u32); > + > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS), /* TAG -> only audit or > decrypt session uses TPM2_ST_SESSIONS */ > + tpm_u32(message_len),/* Length */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_POLICY_GET_DIGEST),/* Command code */ > + /* session handle 4 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(session_handle), /* TPMI_SH_POLICY */ > + }; > + > + size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > + u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > + int ret; > + u16 tag; > + u32 size, code; > + > + ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > + if (ret) > + return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > + > + if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdds", > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > + 12, out_digest, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) //digest_size > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + return ret; > +} > + > u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index, > - size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > - const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) > + size_t space_size, u32 nv_attributes, > + const u8 *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size) > { > /* > * Calculate the offset of the nv_policy piece by adding each of the > * chunks below. > */ > const int platform_len = sizeof(u32); > - const int session_hdr_len = 13; > + const int session_hdr_len = 15; > const int message_len = 14; > - uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > - message_len; > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > message_len; > + u8 attrs = 0; > + > + //if(session_handle != TPM2_RS_PW) > + //attrs = 1; //continue_session (bit 1) > + > u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > /* header 10 bytes */ > tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > @@ -806,20 +979,24 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > space_index, > tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_DEFINE_SPACE),/* Command code */ > > /* handles 4 bytes */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed, requires > TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE*/ > + > > - /* session header 13 bytes */ > + /* session header 15 bytes */ > + /*null auth session*/ > tpm_u32(9), /* Header size */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Password authorisation */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW),/* auth session handle if it's active, > otherwise TPM2_RS_PW*/ > tpm_u16(0), /* nonce_size */ > - 0, /* session_attrs */ > + attrs, /* session_attrs */ > + tpm_u16(0), /* HMAC size */ > + /*end auth area*/ > tpm_u16(0), /* auth_size */ > > /* message 14 bytes + policy */ > tpm_u16(message_len + nv_policy_size), /* size */ > tpm_u32(space_index), > tpm_u16(TPM2_ALG_SHA256), > - tpm_u32(nv_attributes), > + tpm_u32(nv_attributes | TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE), > tpm_u16(nv_policy_size), > /* > * nv_policy > @@ -841,6 +1018,35 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 > space_index, > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > } > > +u32 tpm2_nv_undefine_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 space_index) > +{ > + const int platform_len = sizeof(u32); > + const int session_hdr_len = 13; > + const int message_len = 4; > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_HDR_LEN + platform_len + session_hdr_len + > + message_len),/* Length - header + provision + index + > auth area*/ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_UNDEFINE_SPACE),/* Command code */ > + > + /* handles 4 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > + /* nv_index */ > + tpm_u32(space_index), > + > + /*null auth session*/ > + tpm_u32(9), /* Header size */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Password authorisation*/ > + tpm_u16(0), /* nonce_size */ > + 0, /* session_attrs */ > + tpm_u16(0), /* HMAC size */ > + /*end auth area*/ > + > + }; > + return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > +} > + > u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, u32 algorithm, > const u8 *digest, u32 digest_len) > { > @@ -884,56 +1090,99 @@ u32 tpm2_pcr_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > u32 algorithm, > return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, NULL, NULL); > } > > -u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 count) > +u32 tpm2_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 > count, u32 *session_handle) > { > - u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > - /* header 10 bytes */ > - tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > - tpm_u32(10 + 8 + 4 + 9 + 4), /* Length */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_READ), /* Command code */ > + u32 offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 8 + 4 + 6; > + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; > > - /* handles 8 bytes */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RH_PLATFORM), /* Primary platform seed */ > - tpm_u32(HR_NV_INDEX + index), /* Password authorisation */ > + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > > - /* AUTH_SESSION */ > - tpm_u32(9), /* Authorization size */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ > - /* <nonce> (if any) */ > - 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > - /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > + if (!priv) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + u32 nonce_size = priv->nonce_sz; > + priv->nonce[nonce_size - 1]++; //increase nonce. > + > + u32 authorization = TPM2_RS_PW; > > - tpm_u16(count), /* Number of bytes */ > - tpm_u16(0), /* Offset */ > + if (session_handle) > + authorization = *session_handle; > + else > + nonce_size = 0; //cannot use nonce when using password > authorization > + > + u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > + /* header 10 bytes */ > + tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > + tpm_u32(offset + nonce_size + 7), /* Length */ > + tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_READ), /* Command code */ > + > + /* handles 8 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(index), /* Primary platform seed */ > + tpm_u32(index), /*nv index*/ > + > + /* AUTH_SESSION */ > + tpm_u32(9 + nonce_size), /* Authorization > size - 4 bytes*/ > + /*auth handle - 9 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(authorization), > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), /* Size of <nonce> */ > + /* <nonce> (if any) */ > + //0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > + /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > + /*end auth handle */ > + //tpm_u16(count), /* Number of bytes */ > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Offset */ > }; > + > size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > int ret; > u16 tag; > u32 size, code; > > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sbwww", > + offset, priv->nonce, nonce_size, > + offset + nonce_size, 0, > + offset + nonce_size + 1, 0, > + offset + nonce_size + 3, count, > + offset + nonce_size + 5, 0); > + > + if (ret) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > ret = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command_v2, response, &response_len); > if (ret) > return log_msg_ret("read", ret); > + > if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_len, "wdds", > - 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > - 16, data, count)) > + 0, &tag, 2, &size, 6, &code, > + 16, data, count)) > return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > return 0; > } > > u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *data, > - u32 count) > + u32 count, u32 *session_handle) > { > struct tpm_chip_priv *priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); > - uint offset = 10 + 8 + 4 + 9 + 2; > - uint len = offset + count + 2; > - /* Use empty password auth if platform hierarchy is disabled */ > - u32 auth = priv->plat_hier_disabled ? HR_NV_INDEX + index : > - TPM2_RH_PLATFORM; > + > + if (!priv) > + return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > + > + u32 nonce_size = priv->nonce_sz; > + priv->nonce[nonce_size - 1]++; > + > + u32 authorization = TPM2_RS_PW; > + > + if (session_handle != NULL) > + authorization = *session_handle; > + else > + nonce_size = 0; //cannot use nonce when using password > authorization > + > + uint offset = TPM2_HDR_LEN + 8 + 4 + 6; > + uint len = offset + nonce_size + count + 7; > + > u8 command_v2[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE] = { > /* header 10 bytes */ > tpm_u16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), /* TAG */ > @@ -941,27 +1190,35 @@ u32 tpm2_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 > index, const void *data, > tpm_u32(TPM2_CC_NV_WRITE), /* Command code */ > > /* handles 8 bytes */ > - tpm_u32(auth), /* Primary platform seed */ > - tpm_u32(HR_NV_INDEX + index), /* Password authorisation */ > + tpm_u32(index), /* Primary platform seed */ > + tpm_u32(index), /*nv index*/ > > /* AUTH_SESSION */ > - tpm_u32(9), /* Authorization size */ > - tpm_u32(TPM2_RS_PW), /* Session handle */ > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <nonce> */ > + tpm_u32(9 + nonce_size), /* Authorization size - > 4 bytes */ > + /*auth handle - 9 bytes */ > + tpm_u32(authorization), > + tpm_u16(nonce_size), /* Size of <nonce> */ > /* <nonce> (if any) */ > - 0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > - tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > + //0, /* Attributes: Cont/Excl/Rst */ > + //tpm_u16(0), /* Size of <hmac/password> */ > /* <hmac/password> (if any) */ > - > - tpm_u16(count), > + /*end auth handle */ > + //tpm_u16(count),/*size of buffer - 2 bytes*/ > + /*data (buffer)*/ > + /*offset -> the octet offset into the NV Area*/ > }; > size_t response_len = COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE; > u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE]; > int ret; > > - ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sw", > - offset, data, count, > - offset + count, 0); > + ret = pack_byte_string(command_v2, sizeof(command_v2), "sbwwsw", > + offset, priv->nonce, nonce_size, > + offset + nonce_size, 0, //attrs > + offset + nonce_size +1, 0, //hmac sz > + offset + nonce_size + 3, count, > + offset + nonce_size + 5, data, count, > + offset + nonce_size + count, 0); > + > if (ret) > return TPM_LIB_ERROR; > > diff --git a/lib/tpm_api.c b/lib/tpm_api.c > index 39a5121e30..5875e7b085 100644 > --- a/lib/tpm_api.c > +++ b/lib/tpm_api.c > @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ u32 tpm_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > void *data, u32 count) > if (tpm_is_v1(dev)) > return tpm1_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count); > else if (tpm_is_v2(dev)) > - return tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count); > + return tpm2_nv_read_value(dev, index, data, count, NULL); > else > return -ENOSYS; > } > @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ u32 tpm_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, > const void *data, > if (tpm_is_v1(dev)) > return tpm1_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count); > else if (tpm_is_v2(dev)) > - return tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count); > + return tpm2_nv_write_value(dev, index, data, count, NULL); > else > return -ENOSYS; > } > -- > 2.34.1 > ====================END PATCH============================ > ________________________________ > 差出人: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpen...@linaro.org> > 送信日時: 2024年2月21日 02:56 > 宛先: Niek Nooijens / OC-IAB PBD-C DEVEL 1-1 <niek.nooij...@omron.com> > CC: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodi...@linaro.org>; u-boot@lists.denx.de > <u-boot@lists.denx.de> > 件名: Re: [PATCH] implement policy_pcr commands to lock NV-indexes behind a PCR > > [dan.carpen...@linaro.org > からのメールを受け取る頻度は高くありません。これが問題である可能性の理由については、https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification > をご覧ください。] > > I'm kind of new to u-boot and I'm not really able to review this code > as well as I should. > > But also I can't apply the patch. It seems white space damaged? The > kernel has a good document on how to do this. I'm pretty sure u-boot > does as well but I'm new. > https://jpn01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kernel.org%2Fdoc%2FDocumentation%2Fprocess%2Femail-clients.rst&data=05%7C02%7Cniek.nooijens%40omron.com%7Cfff2a571b0f64e4cee7308dc323d3de9%7C0ecff5a94bef4a7b96eca96579b4ac37%7C0%7C0%7C638440485810051997%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=dU5lPn1UMeoLauNg2lVkRsopKimQ5qwJda11ZRm%2FJhQ%3D&reserved=0 > > Please run your patch through the scripts/checkpatch.pl script. Stuff > like this triggers a warning: > > > +static int do_tpm_nv_write_value(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, > > + int argc, char *const argv[]) //TODO: session > > handle from auth session! > > +{ > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 nv_addr, nv_size, rc; > > + void *session_addr = NULL; > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = get_tpm(&dev); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + if (argc < 4) > > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > > WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (0, 0) > #250: FILE: cmd/tpm-v2.c:437: > + if (ret) > + return ret; > > WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements (0, 0) > #253: FILE: cmd/tpm-v2.c:440: > + if (argc < 4) > + return CMD_RET_USAGE; > > Also the subject should have a subsystem prefix and the information from > the email should be moved into the commit message. Currently the commit > message is empty. > > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > index 33dd103767..5b60883777 100644 > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > @@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { > > */ > > enum tpm2_handles { > > TPM2_RH_OWNER = 0x40000001, > > - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > + TPM2_RH_NULL = 0x40000007, > > + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, > > Changing TPM2_RS_PW is an unrelated whitespace change. Do that as a > separate patch. But I don't get it at all because the TPM2_RS_PW enum > has always been indented correctly as far as I can see. So it's a > puzzle. > > I mean there are a lot of TODOs and I understand that you just wanted a > high level review but I kept getting distracted and lost and I couldn't > apply the patch so it was just really hard to figure out what was going > on. :( > > regards, > dan carpenter >
