On 29/11/2017 19:30, Allen wrote: >> On 17/11/2017 05:51, Cyberpotato wrote: >>> Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the >>> number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate >>> and/or use to access a single hidden service? The use case would be to >>> generate a unique .onion address/descriptor for each user of a hidden >>> service. If i were to generate and advertise/introduce, let's say 500 (or >>> more) unique hidden service descriptors, would there be any issue with >>> that? Is building & maintaining that many circuits practical or possible? >> Yes, it's possible but Tor will crash: >> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15251 > I've created 200 hidden services before and it worked, but I didn't > have much load (incoming connections). If you did this, you would > probably want to run more than one tor process anyway for load > balancing--AFAIK, each tor process is essentially single-threaded, so > if you have 10 cores on your computer, you might want to run 10 tor > processes, each with a different DataDirectory and SOCKSPort, and with > 50 hidden services. Well, actually Tor does enforce a limit of 10 Onion Service each 5 minutes:
"Nov 30 10:29:10 ip-172-30-0-214 Tor[9927]: Hidden service 57er2vo2bi7wtg7n exceeded launch limit with 10 intro points in the last 58 seconds. Intro circuit launches are limited to 10 per 300 seconds. [5969 similar message(s) suppressed in last 300 seconds]" That's enforced from a constant: src/or/hs_common.h:#define NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX 10 So we can assume that, by loading 10 Tor Onion Services trough Tor Control Port every 300 seconds, we can insert 2880 Onion Services a day. The issue is: 1. Will Tor process will be able to have 2880 Onion Services loaded in memory? 2. What happen if Tor looose a network connection for some minutes, when the connection come back? (Will Tor try to re-establish 2880 Onion Services connections exploding? Those are the kind of testing and limitations that we must do, achieve and fix as a way to provide scalability to Tor Onion Services. -naif -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
