Wow. You just blew my mind. So anonymity and privacy for users, but not contributors that make said privacy features possible? By that reasoning ContactInfo would be mandatory, which it's not. It also follows that MyFamily would become a high-priority (mandatory) feature to implement rather than something which is considered for elimination. I'm curious--how do you intend to prove two relay with similar subnet and ASN are related? I would be very interested in that proof.
So regarding users/clients, don't ask, don't tell, and, in fact, heavily document how they can avoid identification. Regarding infrastructure operators. If you withhold *non-mandatory* information you *will* be suspect. Even if you happen to be a university. I feel so much better now. x-num of relays registered to a public institution, forced disclosure follows, that or be seen as a threat -> relays associated with department ---> relays associated with research -----> relays associated with graduate -and- if the research isn't approved by tor network as a whole -> researcher becomes a target -which means- tor research becomes discouraged -> bugs, flaws not identified ---> state intelligence win I propose you change the documentation, and the code to reflect your stance. Which to me sounds like bs. The truth is anonymity of tor is for the good, and bad, no matter how subjective. It's also a matter of practice that a relay is only be marked bad if you do something bad, or are incapable of performing relay duties. Otherwise you loose flags. At not point is it an acceptable to treat a relay group as suspect for missing non-mandatory data. The spec and design doc says you're wrong. Every researcher falls into two categories: those who support the government and see tor as a possible threat, and those who support privacy-anonymity advocacy. Singling out relay operators means the former consider the choice wise, and makes the latter second guess. It was wrong to push the operator. Engaging in research isn't wrong. There's a completely valid reason to not want to have this information available and this specific event is an example. If you allow elicit drug harbors because you can't prove where they are--how can you assume a relay may be malicious without gathering evidence. Your public descriptors give you no right over the operator identity. Deal with it. What if the operator of these relays had ignored you? They should have. You would have gone bonkers wouldn't you. --leeroy -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
