On 8/22/14, no.thing_to-h...@cryptopathie.eu <no.thing_to-h...@cryptopathie.eu> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > I just downloaded the old version 3.6.3, the download link on > http://www.neowin.net/news/tor-browser-bundle-363 > still works and leads to the file > https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/3.6.3/torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe > > When I use jacksum on this file, the result is > > c8eb88324526d718b937b616c75d33a8 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe
which does not match what I get > This is another MD5 checksum than from the mentioned installer package > > 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 which is what I get: C:\temp\2do>md5 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe which matches what the OP got >> The install package >> torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe has the MD5 signature: >> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 > I was not able to download the PGP signature of the file to verify its > integrity. I did: /cygdrive/c/temp/2do $ gpg --verify torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe.asc gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory! gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.html for more information gpg: Signature made Fri Jul 25 13:19:46 2014 EDT using RSA key ID 63FEE659 gpg: Good signature from "Erinn Clark <er...@torproject.org>" gpg: aka "Erinn Clark <er...@debian.org>" gpg: aka "Erinn Clark <er...@double-helix.org>" gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 8738 A680 B84B 3031 A630 F2DB 416F 0610 63FE E659 > One of us downloaded a wrong Tor installer package ... Looks like it was you.. Regards, Lee > > Best regards > > Anton > - -- > no.thing_to-hide at cryptopathie dot eu > 0x30C3CDF0, RSA 2048, 24 Mar 2014 > 0FF8 A811 8857 1B7E 195B 649E CC26 E1A5 30C3 CDF0 > Bitmessage (no metadata): BM-2cXixKZaqzJmTfz6ojiyLzmKg2JbzDnApC > > > > On 22/08/14 23:38, bm-2cvvnfwsftfx8dv12l8z8pjejmtrjyj...@bitmessage.ch > wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I have TOR 3.6.3 installed in a Windows XP computer that is used >> almost just for it with very few additional software installed. My >> understanding is that a potential attacker will test his >> exploit/approach against most of the security software available, >> but possibly will not be able to test against ALL of them, so I >> have a miscelaneous of popular and not popular security software >> installed in the same computer; among them is a not so common anti >> spyware called Zemana. >> >> I am using TOR browser and Zemana for years and I am familiar with >> the behaviour of both. The TOR I am running has just the extensions >> that comes with it; no additional extension was installed; no >> plug-in is installed. >> >> I have proper licenses to run all the software, including Zemana, >> so no crack or other suspicious tool was ever used. Zemana is a >> quiet software and I can not remember about any single fake alert. >> >> >> Few days ago, while browsing with TOR, I got a shocking alert from >> Zemana: TOR TRIED TO TAKE A SNAPSHOT OF MY SCREEN. >> >> >> As Zemana allow me, I did block such screen capture and TOR >> crashed immediatly. By this crash I understand that TOR really >> tried to capture my screen. >> >> I restarted TOR with a new identity, changed the identity many >> times but TOR repeated the same behaviour a number of times with >> the screen capture try-Zemana block-TOR crash. Change the identity >> just does not works for such attacker. >> >> The script funcions were always blocked by NoScript 2.6.8.36. >> >> On the following days I used TOR again, without any change in my >> system or software, accessing the same web sites but the attack no >> longer took place. >> >> >> I verified the MD5 signature for the TOR browser (firefox.exe) and >> it is unchanged, i.e, it is as distributed by torproject.org >> >> The TOR 3.6.3 was downloaded from the TOR project web site, and not >> from other servers. The install package >> torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe has the MD5 signature: >> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 I have the installer in my files >> for any forensic work. >> >> I am sending some screens with the Zemana log, where is possible to >> see the TOR MD5 signature (firefox.exe; >> FC19E4AFB0E68BD4D25745A57AE14047) and the logged behaviour >> ("screenlogger"), the TOR version, TOR button and the Zemana >> version screens, and the extensions and plug-ins existing in my >> TOR install (just to confirm that nothing strange is there). They >> are available to download here: >> http://www.datafilehost.com/d/dfb201d8 or >> https://www.sendspace.com/file/6ygdl3 >> >> >> >> Seems that TOR has hidden server capabilities, a back door that >> allow a remote operator take snap shot of the screen and possible >> perform other actions (record mic, turn on the webcam, ...). >> >> >> I think TOR can protect the users from many enemies, but at the >> same time it is a perfect tool to attract, identify and log very >> specific (users) targets. This may explain also the, until now, >> unclear role and objectives of the US goverment by funding the TOR >> Project. >> >> Seems that hardly will be possible to identify suck attacker as it >> probably comes from the TOR network itself, but I am considering a >> trap/honney pot just in case this repeats. >> >> >> I am an entusiast of privacy tools and TOR is not used for any kind >> of unlawful purposes, is unlikely that I will attract attention >> from public authorities and I am not worried with any data such >> attacker eventually may have had access. >> >> >> Hope this information may help to improve the TOR community >> security and in some point in the future we will able to find a >> solution for this back door. > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Icedove - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJT98FZAAoJEMwm4aUww83w+xUH/iUhYY2HTDWDmUEbK4H5T75G > Zhb66G6i+fYslT1WxFT6nSi2Ks4j1uonpB6l0ZIa8kwBrNU7jT9OhyLqYgnRrMT3 > jCld59B8VDJxrBNrjw8N9I/zQ7aHBYzla5v5daqa5d1gMBG0h7OBm/F4t46ZHtu/ > NyssqaTh9p0SbbgunevjCNJUELUH9/i9Os4VsOlvoA4mKl6mNH4Conck7fFoCtKn > dHW9hFSTM82lUXVo34IUqtMI4COiEosSBiyzErk0YWurQXIeF9IEQB1dGXWftY9/ > 35ecqy8gxqt4Q/pQBFkKAb11fip5zqaWL82HaeEyeIFOP1rxzCjWvzN6Yyvf9VI= > =mEfz > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
