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I just downloaded the old version 3.6.3, the download link on
http://www.neowin.net/news/tor-browser-bundle-363
still works and leads to the file
https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/3.6.3/torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe
When I use jacksum on this file, the result is
c8eb88324526d718b937b616c75d33a8 torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe
This is another MD5 checksum than from the mentioned installer package
9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04
I was not able to download the PGP signature of the file to verify its
integrity.
One of us downloaded a wrong Tor installer package ...
Best regards
Anton
- --
no.thing_to-hide at cryptopathie dot eu
0x30C3CDF0, RSA 2048, 24 Mar 2014
0FF8 A811 8857 1B7E 195B 649E CC26 E1A5 30C3 CDF0
Bitmessage (no metadata): BM-2cXixKZaqzJmTfz6ojiyLzmKg2JbzDnApC
On 22/08/14 23:38, bm-2cvvnfwsftfx8dv12l8z8pjejmtrjyj...@bitmessage.ch
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I have TOR 3.6.3 installed in a Windows XP computer that is used
> almost just for it with very few additional software installed. My
> understanding is that a potential attacker will test his
> exploit/approach against most of the security software available,
> but possibly will not be able to test against ALL of them, so I
> have a miscelaneous of popular and not popular security software
> installed in the same computer; among them is a not so common anti
> spyware called Zemana.
>
> I am using TOR browser and Zemana for years and I am familiar with
> the behaviour of both. The TOR I am running has just the extensions
> that comes with it; no additional extension was installed; no
> plug-in is installed.
>
> I have proper licenses to run all the software, including Zemana,
> so no crack or other suspicious tool was ever used. Zemana is a
> quiet software and I can not remember about any single fake alert.
>
>
> Few days ago, while browsing with TOR, I got a shocking alert from
> Zemana: TOR TRIED TO TAKE A SNAPSHOT OF MY SCREEN.
>
>
> As Zemana allow me, I did block such screen capture and TOR
> crashed immediatly. By this crash I understand that TOR really
> tried to capture my screen.
>
> I restarted TOR with a new identity, changed the identity many
> times but TOR repeated the same behaviour a number of times with
> the screen capture try-Zemana block-TOR crash. Change the identity
> just does not works for such attacker.
>
> The script funcions were always blocked by NoScript 2.6.8.36.
>
> On the following days I used TOR again, without any change in my
> system or software, accessing the same web sites but the attack no
> longer took place.
>
>
> I verified the MD5 signature for the TOR browser (firefox.exe) and
> it is unchanged, i.e, it is as distributed by torproject.org
>
> The TOR 3.6.3 was downloaded from the TOR project web site, and not
> from other servers. The install package
> torbrowser-install-3.6.3_en-US.exe has the MD5 signature:
> 9529C5A633CF0CF6201662CA12630A04 I have the installer in my files
> for any forensic work.
>
> I am sending some screens with the Zemana log, where is possible to
> see the TOR MD5 signature (firefox.exe;
> FC19E4AFB0E68BD4D25745A57AE14047) and the logged behaviour
> ("screenlogger"), the TOR version, TOR button and the Zemana
> version screens, and the extensions and plug-ins existing in my
> TOR install (just to confirm that nothing strange is there). They
> are available to download here:
> http://www.datafilehost.com/d/dfb201d8 or
> https://www.sendspace.com/file/6ygdl3
>
>
>
> Seems that TOR has hidden server capabilities, a back door that
> allow a remote operator take snap shot of the screen and possible
> perform other actions (record mic, turn on the webcam, ...).
>
>
> I think TOR can protect the users from many enemies, but at the
> same time it is a perfect tool to attract, identify and log very
> specific (users) targets. This may explain also the, until now,
> unclear role and objectives of the US goverment by funding the TOR
> Project.
>
> Seems that hardly will be possible to identify suck attacker as it
> probably comes from the TOR network itself, but I am considering a
> trap/honney pot just in case this repeats.
>
>
> I am an entusiast of privacy tools and TOR is not used for any kind
> of unlawful purposes, is unlikely that I will attract attention
> from public authorities and I am not worried with any data such
> attacker eventually may have had access.
>
>
> Hope this information may help to improve the TOR community
> security and in some point in the future we will able to find a
> solution for this back door.
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