On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 02:54:57PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 07:29:39PM +0000, Matthew Finkel wrote: > > The one thing I always think about when I hear about the comparison of > > censorship circumvention vs. anonymity[0] is something I once heard (maybe > > from Jake or Roger, I apologies for not having a citation), > > Jake and I tried to emphasize the "censorship implies surveillance" > meme in our 28c3 talk. >
I thought that was where I originally heard it, too. Alas, it was not mentioned during that talk, nor was it mentioned during 23c3 or Internet Days. I wonder if anyone else knows what I'm talking about. > > Assuming I recall the basis of the quote correctly, this is an extremely > > important idea that must be understood when dealing with censorship. > > Going back to the PirateBrowser, if they are stripping out all of the > > fantastic work Mike has done to preserve a users Anonymity (and the > > packaging Erinn has done) and they replace it with Portable Firefox, I > > don't think it can reach the full potential of "No more censorship!" > > that they proclaim. > > Right. I expect they're going to have a real challenge teaching > their users about what they're getting and what they're not getting. I > appreciate the experiment and want to see how it goes -- but that said, > we should keep an eye out for sentences that start with "And since you're > using Tor", since a downside for the Tor world could be that they start > mis-educating other Tor users. > > As an aside, we already experience this mis-education in the context > of for-profit VPN companies, where they compete to see who can write > "100% guaranteed bulletproof encryption" in the blinkiest font on their > websites, whereas Tor instead works to explain that some parts of the > protocol provide encryption and others don't: > https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/articles/circumvention-features.html#7 > Number 10 is quite relevant for this (The 23c3 talk also describes the content of this paper, for those who do not want to read). > > However, I do think it is worth it to look at what > > magic they use in Iran and North Korea. Is it more than using Tor and a > > hidden service? > > I assume they just assume that Tor magically gets around all censorship, > and haven't explored any further than that. Happy to be shown wrong. That would be sad if that is the case. I saw Tom just posted some info on Libtech. Some interesting choices [0]: -------------SNIP----------------------- Some other random stats for the curious. Tor v0.2.3.25 (git-17c24b3118224d65) Vidalia 0.2.21 (QT 4.8.1) # Configured for speed ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0 AllowSingleHopCircuits 1 # Exclude countries that might have blocks ExcludeExitNodes {dk},{ie},{gb},{nl},{be},{it},{cn},{ir},{fi},{no} #Selected user prefs user_pref("browser.startup.homepage", "http://6kkgg7nth3sbuuwd.onion"); user_pref("general.useragent.override", "PB0.6b Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:23.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/23.0"); --------------------------SNIP------------------------ - Matt [0] https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-August/010765.html -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
