Sorry perhaps I didn't explain well enough. What I was pointing to was that tor could benefit from the idea of cheaply crowd sponsored relays that use ansible, chef or puppet to spin up for a month. That the article is about bitcoin is merely coincidental. -J On 06/26/2014 05:35 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: > ja...@icetor.is wrote: > >> This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for >> Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a >> month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF? >> >> http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-security/ >> > Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talk > SOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not > in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes > as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut > down by currency counterfeiters (e.g., the Federal Reserve and the central > banks of other states, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Performance of hidden > services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, > which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a > possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes > access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays. > > > Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG > ********************************************************************** > * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * > *--------------------------------------------------------------------* > * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * > * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * > * -- a standing army." * > * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * > ********************************************************************** >
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