I don’t think that is a good answer. - I think a reply from TLS should include the technical analysis of their use of the TLS protocol. That is why they are writing TLS WG. The only reason of not saying that psk_ke for external PSKs is a very bad choice would be to save the face of RFC 8446. - I think the Pentagon paper I linked to is a better reference that NSA and GCHQ. Pentagon is a user, not a SIGINT. Also, the contact for the Pentagon paper is Brita Hale, which most of us know. - If we refer to QIRC is should be to point out that quantum communication is pure research.
John From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]> Date: Monday, 23 March 2026 at 15:55 To: Eric Rescorla <[email protected]>, Salz, Rich <[email protected]> Cc: Andrei Popov <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: LS on the work item related to QKD and TLS integration framework in SG13 Minor correction: it's the QIRG (Quantum Internet Research Group), not the QCRG. ________________________________ From: Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2026 9:50 AM To: Salz, Rich <[email protected]> Cc: Andrei Popov <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: LS on the work item related to QKD and TLS integration framework in SG13 If we must say something, I think it should be more along the lines of this statement. Ekr On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 5:32 AM Salz, Rich <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: * I agree with this. It makes sense to respond, in simple technical terms. Not with judgement, not with assumption of ill intent by any parties. Just plain technical advice. Totally agree! It can be as simple as The TLS working group feels that QKD is still too premature to be a secure solution to any problem. We note that other organizations also feel this way [refs to UKNCSC, NSA if needed]. We are unlikely to do any work in this area now. We suggest that you look at the QCRG, in our related organization the IRTF, which has active QKD discussions. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
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