Correction: it turns out that reusing randomness during encapsulation isn't 
quite as broken as I first thought.

Now, the two clients that you encrypted to can both learn each other's shared 
secret (and so the MUST NOT statement is perfectly appropriate); however a 
third party cannot.

On 01.03.26 18:18, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) wrote:

Oh, and I just noticed (and perhaps this is common knowledge): if you used the 
same encapsulation randomness to encapsulate to two different public keys (from 
the same parameter set), then it is fairly easy to recover both shared secrets 
(assuming access to both ciphertexts and public keys).  Hence, the MUST NOT 
reuse encapsulation randomness statement is there for an extremely good reason.
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