The formatting is really messed up here. I will preface my inline comments with “R$ 25-Mar” I removed the points where we agree (mainly I changed the text and you approved it :) WG may tell them to migrate to TLS 1.3. In order to avoid disconnects about how that is supposed to work, I’d like we better characterize “urgent security fixes”. Thanks. R$ 25-Mar: I understand that urgent is not a precise term, but I cannot think of anything better and to me it accurately conveys the situation. The WG really does not want to ever look at TLS 1.2 again but we have to leave open the possibility that it might happen. I am open to suggestions to change, but expect that the WG would have to approve it.
## I think “for TLS 1.2-only” would be more accurate as some of these are applicable to TLS1.3 as well. Consider updating accordingly: CURRENT: This document specifies that except urgent security fixes, new TLS Exporter Labels, or new Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs, no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2. I do not understand this comment. If you mean a new extension is added that *would* be usable in TLS 1.2, we’re saying that it is not defined for TLS 1.2 even if it would “just work.” Is that your point? [Med] Some extensions may be applicable independent of the version. I think that it is more accurate: s/no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2/ no changes will be approved for ‘TLS 1.2’-only. R$ 25-Mar: No. Even if it is possible to use an extension for TLS 1.2, we want to make it very clear that people should not expect it to show up in their TLS 1.2 libraries. # Section 2 ## Provider examples of “huge impact” mentioned in this text: , and the like. Doing this would muddy the waters for the clear statement we want to make. [Med] Alternatively, you may simply say “be powerful enough to break conventional cryptographic systems, such as RSA, FFDH, and ECC”. R$ 25-Mar: how about this: “Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, are likely to greatly lesssen the time and effort needed to break RSA, FFDH, or ECC which are currently used in TLS.” ## On the various NIST citations: Are there any other similar pointers to list for non-US regions? There does not seem to be. At a recent IETF side meeting, several countries said “we’re following the NIST algorithms.” As that is the only standard published so far, it seems okay. [Med] ACK for the algo part. Maybe this can be balanced by briefly citing the migration roadmap announced by non-US countries (e.g., ETSI (TR 103 619 - V1.1.1 - CYBER; Migration strategies and recommendations to Quantum kkkkSafe schemes<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103600_103699/103619/01.01.01_60/tr_103619v010101p.pdf__;!!GjvTz_vk!RUNQyWdWUylYLlrfk9yyOWhu0xYrHkwQWos4aQegUZL-imLU3tjD-ikQJUibOd019hkxzGlftglyXXbWozN3SY6h$>) or the latest UK plan (https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines__;!!GjvTz_vk!RUNQyWdWUylYLlrfk9yyOWhu0xYrHkwQWos4aQegUZL-imLU3tjD-ikQJUibOd019hkxzGlftglyXXbWo6VDWo-A$>)). R$ 25-Mar: I added a point to ETSI: In 2024 NIST released standards for {{ML-KEM}}, {{ML-DSA}}, and {{SLH-DSA}}. Many other countries and organizations are publishing their roadmaps, including the multi-national standards organization ETSI, {{?ETSI}}
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