Mohamed Boucadair has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-06: Discuss
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Hi Rich, Thank you for the effort put in this effort. Thanks to Jen Linkova for the opsdir review. I understood that her comment will be fixed. I’m supportive of this work. I will be balloting “Yes” after the DISCUSS point is addressed. ## On urgent security conditions CURRENT: This document specifies that outside of urgent security fixes, and the exceptions listed in Section 4, no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2. Who will make the call about what is “urgent”? Is it the TLS WG? Else? What about extensions that may be required by applications defined in other WGs? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- FWIW, my full review can be found at: * pdf: https://github.com/boucadair/IETF-Drafts-Reviews/blob/master/2025/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-06-rev%20Med.pdf * doc: https://github.com/boucadair/IETF-Drafts-Reviews/blob/master/2025/draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-06-rev%20Med.doc Only a subset of items are echoed here. The author can refer to the full review for nits/edits/etc. # Abstract ## Reword for better clarity OLD: Use of TLS 1.3 is growing and fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2. NEW: Use of TLS 1.3, which fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2, is growing. ## I think “for TLS 1.2-only” would be more accurate as some of these are applicable to TLS1.3 as well. Consider updating accordingly: CURRENT: This document specifies that except urgent security fixes, new TLS Exporter Labels, or new Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs, no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2. # Introduction ## Reword for better clarity OLD: Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. NEW: Both TLS versions have several extension points. Items such as new cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. As a side note on “etc.”, I’d like to check if we should be more explicit here given that we have notes in the registry such as: “Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as previous versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently, only specifying the symmetric ciphers and hash function, and cannot be used for TLS 1.2. Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suite values cannot be used with TLS 1.3.” # Section 2 ## Provider examples of “huge impact” mentioned in this text: CURRENT: Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, will have a huge impact on RSA, FFDH, and ECC which are currently used in TLS. ## On the various NIST citations: Are there any other similar pointers to list for non-US regions? # Section 4: ## I think the IANA registries should be authoritative here, not the RFC. CURRENT: No registries [TLS13REG] are being closed by this document. ## Call out this is about TLS registries: OLD: No registries [TLS13REG] are being closed by this document. NEW: No registries in TLS registry groups [REF] are being closed by this document. ## Not any random registry, but TLS: OLD: Any registries created after this document is approved for publication should indicate whether the actions defined here are applicable. NEW: Any TLS registry created after this document is approved for publication should indicate whether the actions defined here are applicable. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
