Hi all, unfortunately I wasn't able to attend the meeting this week, but I
had a chance to catch up on youtube (
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQ-Bz60AppI). I wanted to add one more
point to the ECH discussion that might be helpful for moving this topic
forward.

There were three presentations about the ECH public name, from Nick,
Martin, and Jonathan. I think some folks were talking about these
presentations as if they're solving the same problem, but to my thinking,
Nick's draft would solve a slightly different problem than Martin+Jonathan.

Nick's draft is about reachability. Whether a TLS server is reachable via
ECH depends on whether the handshakes with ECH clients are treated
differently by the network than other handshakes. We say that ECH "doesn't
stick out" if it's indistinguishable from some "cover protocol" the network
is known to tolerate, which would imply reachability. This is the idea
behind GREASE ECH as well as middlebox compatibility mode for TLS 1.3. Both
ECH and TLS 1.3 are distinguishable from their cover protocols, but less so
than their predecessors (ESNI and early drafts of TLS 1.3 respectively).

If I understand Martin+Jonathan's idea correctly, it is mainly about
indistinguishability of ECH handshakes across TLS servers. This would be a
great property to have, and not just for privacy: If deployed at a large
enough scale, I think either mechanism would provide some degree of "fate
sharing" in the sense it would be hard to block ECH traffic to one server
without blocking ECH traffic to all servers.

However I don't think this would imply reachability for the internet as it
is today, at least not without some sort of cover protocol. On the other
hand, GREASE ECH is already widely deployed.

Both properties are nice to have, but we may have to prioritize one over
the other. One approach is to make handshakes look like existing
handshakes; this is more or less what TLSWG has done so far. Another
approach is to make all handshakes look like each other; this is the idea
behind pseudorandom cTLS [1]. I'd wager we all would like to build the
latter world, but the real world probably looks more like the former.

Best,
Chris P.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-cpbs-pseudorandom-ctls-01.html
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