All other guidance about TLS configuration has been in UTA unless it's been deprecating weak algorithms. Most recently the TLS WG wanted the "1.2 is frozen" draft split into two parts, and the other part given to UTA.
>> I would express the guidance this way: Use a hybrid that combines PQ >> and “classic” algorithms, so that if one is broken you’re still >> safe. If you are required to use only PQ, so be it. >The latter set of people/applications would not benefit from our >help, so my take is, for the purposes of this document, we should >ignore 'em and not keep having the sigint tail wag the worldsized >dog. It is not just the intelligence community that feels this way and I'm not in a position to judge their reasoning. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
