The one that got to me was: "It SHOULD place the value of ECHConfig.contents.public_name in the "server_name" extension. Clients that do not follow this step, or place a different value in the "server_name" extension, risk breaking the retry mechanism described in Section 6.1.6 or failing to interoperate with servers that require this step to be done; see Section 7.1."
So, that seemed like it might be a problem for the previous analysis. thanks, Rob On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 6:12 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: > > > On 12/03/2024 00:49, Rob Sayre wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 5:21 PM Christopher Patton < > cpat...@cloudflare.com> > > wrote: > > > >> I don't believe there were any changes from draft 13 to 18 that would > >> invalidate security analysis for draft 13: > >> > >> > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-esni-13&url2=draft-ietf-tls-esni-18&difftype=--html > >> > > > > Hmm. It does look like there are few substantial changes in that diff > that > > might be worth re-checking, but I'm not trying to delay things with > > nitpicking. If others feel the analysis of -13 is enough, then let's go. > > Not quite answering the question, but I don't recall any code > changes affecting the crypto plumbing or interop since -13. > > Cheers, > S. > > > > > thanks, > > Rob > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > TLS mailing list > > TLS@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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