Hi Thomas, On 2023-10-09 11:42, Thomas Fossati wrote:
Hi Marco,We think we have addressed all your comments (but one, see below). Could you please check that the PR at [1] is good to go?
==>MT Thank you, the PR looks good me! (please see below about the two other points) <==
[1]https://eur05.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Ftlswg%2Fdtls-rrc%2Fpull%2F63%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Cmarco.tiloca%40ri.se%7C52b4e41e5459444c222508dbc8ac2441%7C5a9809cf0bcb413a838a09ecc40cc9e8%7C0%7C0%7C638324413891462331%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=8WOJtf7yh71vA08CvogTi0Qrlqu8W%2FcTnAfoa33RE%2Bw%3D&reserved=0 The one comment we wanted to have a bit more discussion before deciding how to proceed is this: On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 at 15:50, Marco Tiloca <marco.tiloca=40ri...@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:[Section 7.4] * I think that another requirement should be that the initiator MUST NOT act on more than one valid path_response or path_drop message for each path_challenge message that it has sent.ยง7.4 currently says: "The responder MUST send exactly one path_response or path_drop message for each received path_challenge." So it's not clear how a situation with multiple occurrences of path_drop/path_challenge could come off, if the responder obeys the specified MUST? Could you clarify your concern a bit more?
==>MTRight, I was thinking of spelling out how the initiator should behave if the responder does not comply with the specification.
If that can be excluded altogether or a safe behavior at the responder is obvious/implied, then the current text is just fine.
<==
[Section 10] * You will need to add a new subsection that provides expert review instructions, for the Designated Experts assigned to the new subregistry defined in Section 10.3.Thanks: this made us realise that expert review was a bit too lightweight, therefore we moved to STD required.
==>MT That makes sense. Best, /Marco <==
cheers, thanks!
-- Marco Tiloca Ph.D., Senior Researcher Phone: +46 (0)70 60 46 501 RISE Research Institutes of Sweden AB Box 1263 164 29 Kista (Sweden) Division: Digital Systems Department: Computer Science Unit: Cybersecurity https://www.ri.se
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