Hi,

Two high level comments:


- OLD: "though use of earlier versions is strongly discouraged [RFC8996]"

That is not what RFC 8996 says. RFC 8996 says

- "TLS 1.1 MUST NOT be used."
- "TLS 1.1 MUST NOT be used."

Please change to something that aligns with RFC 8996 such as

NEW: "though use of earlier versions is forbidden [RFC8996]"


-  "Access to the content of a file in SSLKEYLOGFILE allows an attacker
   to break the confidentiality protection on any TLS connections that
   are included in the file."

This is true but does not at all reflect the implications of the existence of a 
file for long-term storage of keys like this. Storing any of the keying 
material like this completely breaks the stated forward secrecy property of TLS 
1.3 as it creates new long-term keys. It does not matter how well the file is 
protected i.e.,

   "Ensuring adequate access control on these files therefore becomes
   very important."

is not enough. The theoretical security properties are still broken badly. I 
think this draft is problematic, but I can understand the need to standardize 
this existing format. I think the fact that SSLKEYLOGFILE breaks the security 
properties of TLS 1.3 needs to very clearly described. As a consequence, I 
think the only allowed use case standardized by TLS WG should be limited to 
non-production debugging. If governments and companies wanting visibility do 
other things, that would be outside of IETFs control.

Cheers,
John

From: TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Martin Thomson 
<m...@lowentropy.net>
Date: Wednesday, 26 October 2022 at 02:18
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] sslkeylogfile
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022, at 16:48, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> But it's not the same thing, it only seems to cover some TLS 1.3 extensions.
> Thus my suggestion to call it "Extensions to the SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS
> 1.3".

That's not the intent.  Section 3.2 covers all you need for TLS 1.2.

I did not describe the (deprecated) "RSA" key, is that in common usage?  Or, 
are there things that I have missed?  I got everything from 
https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/security/nss/legacy/key_log_format/index.html
 but maybe that is no longer the best reference.

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