Assuming I understand Hanno's proposal, I do not believe that this is in fact an improvement, as it does not cover the important case where the record containing the SH is lost and then the rest of the messages from the server are uninterpretable.
-Ekr On Thu, Apr 9, 2020 at 4:27 AM Thomas Fossati <[email protected]> wrote: > Hey Hanno, > > On 08/04/2020, 15:11, "Hanno Becker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > As far as I see, tail loss indication involves a timer in both cases: > > > > - As it stands, tail loss recovery is triggered by the ACK resulting > > from the 'lack of progress' indicator of disruption, described in > > the second bullet point of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-37#section-7.1 > > In particular, it only occurs after a 'short' timer triggered on the > > receiver, where by 'short' I mean that is has smaller threshold than > > the ordinary retransmission timer from DTLS 1.2, marking the bottom > > line recovery time we want to improve upon. > > > > - Likewise, there's short timer based recovery in the new proposal, > > but mirrored: The sender retransmits upon noticing a gap in the > > ACKs, which too can be detected by a short timer as in the current > > proposal. > > You are right, this wouldn't have worse tail-loss recovery than what is > currently specified. So, all things considered it looks like a real > improvement compared to dtls13-37. > > Could collect the text from this thread in a PR against Section 7? This > way folks that haven't followed the discussion closely can see how your > proposal looks overall. > > cheers, thanks! > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the > information in any medium. Thank you. > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
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