Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote:
>NIST has pushed back their date for US government organizations to have a plan
>to support TLSv1.3, what’s the driver to get ahead of that?
NIST SP 800-52 rev 2 requires support for TLS 1.3 by January 1, 2024. I think
that is a good and ambitious plan. In fact it would be very good if IETF agreed
on the same requirement.
> I think encouraging implementation of TLSv1.3 is good and important, but are
> there other ways besides deprecation?
Yes, I think there is at least two things IETF can do:
- The first thing is to do like NIST and already now give implementors a date
when support for TLS 1.3 is required.
- The second thing is to do like 3GPP and mandate support for TLS 1.3 in new
implementations and deployments.
This would avoid two thing that happened in the past. First, IETF published RFC
8261 that mandated support for DTLS 1.0 and not DTLS 1.2 almost 6 years after
RFC 6347 made DTLS 1.0 obsolete. Secondly, just 7 months after publishing a
draft relying on DTLS 1.0, IETF started working on a draft forbidding it’s use.
Cheers,
John
-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com>
Date: Thursday, 26 September 2019 at 15:50
To: "Salz, Rich" <rs...@akamai.com>
Cc: John Mattsson <john.matts...@ericsson.com>, "TLS@ietf.org" <TLS@ietf.org>,
"s...@ietf.org" <s...@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Lessons learned from TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 deprecation
Sent from my mobile device
> On Sep 26, 2019, at 9:02 AM, Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com> wrote:
>
> These are excellent points. Perhaps they can be squeezed into
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/ ? It's
been waiting 90 days, a brief reset might not hurt :)
>
This would not be a brief reset and I’d prefer not to see them combined
into the existing draft with WG agreement.
With RFC7525, TLSv1.2 can be configured to be secure. I see the points
made, but don’t see the urgency as obsolete is different from depreciation.
I think encouraging implementation of TLSv1.3 is good and important, but
are there other ways besides deprecation?
NIST has pushed back their date for US government organizations to have a
plan to support TLSv1.3, what’s the driver to get ahead of that?
A vulnerability would speed things up, but I do hope that does not happen.
Best regards,
Kathleen
> On 9/26/19, 8:18 AM, "John Mattsson"
<john.mattsson=40ericsson....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Hopefully, we have learned some lessons from the TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
deprecation. TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are (to cite Martin Thomson) broken in a
myriad subtle ways and should according to me optimally have been deprecated
years ago.
>
> 3GPP mandated support of TLS 1.2 in Rel-13 (2015) but could at that
time not forbid use of TLS 1.1 as that would potentially break interoperability
with some Rel-12 nodes (that had TLS 1.2 as should support). The lesson 3GPP
learned from this was the need to as early as possible mandate support of new
protocol versions. With TLS 1.3, 3GPP took action early and TLS 1.3 support was
mandated for network nodes in Rel-15 (2018) and for mobile phones in Rel-16
(2019).
>
> At some point in time we will want to deprecate TLS 1.2. To enable
that, TLS 1.3 support should be mandated or encouraged as much as possible. I
would like to avoid a situation where we want to deprecate TLS 1.2 but realize
that it cannot be done because some implementations only support TLS 1.2. How
can IETF enable smoother and faster deprecations in the future? The browser
industry has a decent track record of algorithm deprecation and I hope to soon
see the following warning in my browser:
>
> “TLS 1.2 is obsolete. Enable TLS 1.3 or later.”
>
> Other industries have less stellar track records of algorithm
deprecation.
>
> How can IETF be more pro-active regarding deprecations in the future?
In the best of words, nobody should be surprised when IETF deprecates a
protocol version or algorithm. NIST and similar organizations in other
countries have the practice to long time in advance publish deadlines for
security levels, algorithms, and protocol versions. Can the IETF do something
similar, not just for TLS but in general? For TLS, there are several things to
deprecate, in addition to MD5 and SHA-1, also PKCS1-v1_5, RSA-2048, 224-bit
ECC, ffdhe2048, and non-recommended cipher suites (Static RSA, CBC, DH, NULL,
etc.) should be deprecated in the future.
>
> Cheers,
> John
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
