>From what you both are saying, it looks legitimate to document about this cipher which disappeared. But not here. As suggested I will post another editorial errata for RFC2712, in an appendix form.
Eugene. 2018-06-27 5:30 GMT+02:00 Benjamin Kaduk <ka...@mit.edu>: > I don't really think this is a useful erratum against 5246; the note there > is providing an explanation for why certain values are not used (and should > not be used). But, now, and even at the time 5246 was published, 0x001e > *is* used, and there's no reason to mention it in this context. One could > perhaps argue that 2712 should have noted that a value was being reused (or > have not reused the value at all), and an errata report against 2712 to add > a new appendix section might be reasonable. > > So, absent additional considerations, I plan to reject this report. > > -Ben > > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 04:01:35PM +0200, Eugène Adell wrote: > > Hello, > > > > I had some doubts whether it was technical or editorial, and I have > looked > > at some accepted errata to choose (maybe not the best method) . I thought > > it was technical, because one cipher suite was replaced by another one, > and > > the note already existing gives their numbers, which is a technical > > information. > > > > Although the "mistake" first appears in RFC2712 draft 01, RFC2246 final > > release was published before the final RFC2712. > > RFC2246 is obsoleted but mentions Fortezza, which RFC2712 doesn't. > RFC5246 > > being the only non obsoleted child of RFC2246 mentionning the Fortezza > > group, it looked more natural to suggest the errata at this place instead > > of RFC2712 which is fully dedicated to Kerberos. > > > > > > best regards > > Eugène > > > > > > > > Le mar. 26 juin 2018 à 15:21, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> a écrit : > > > > > First, I think this is editorial. After all these years, I’m not > really > > > sure it’s an interop problem. > > > > > > Second, if I were making this I would have placed the errata against > > > RFC2712 where the values were assigned. It’s not really TLS1..2’s > place to > > > clear this up. > > > > > > spt > > > > > > > On Jun 26, 2018, at 08:28, RFC Errata System < > rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246, > > > > "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------- > > > > You may review the report below and at: > > > > http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5409 > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------- > > > > Type: Technical > > > > Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.ad...@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > Section: Appendix A.5 > > > > > > > > Original Text > > > > ------------- > > > > Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are > > > > reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in > > > > SSL 3. > > > > > > > > Corrected Text > > > > -------------- > > > > Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are > > > > reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in > > > > SSL 3. The cipher suite value { 0x00, 0x1E } firstly also assigned > to > > > > Fortezza has been released and has since been be reassigned. > > > > > > > > Notes > > > > ----- > > > > RFC 2712 (Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer > > > Security) in its Draft 01 version introduces three new cipher suites > > > colliding with the three Fortezza ones. The Draft 02 version partially > > > corrects that, by moving the Kerberos cipher suites values by two. > > > > This omission of the third cipher suite has never been corrected, and > > > this remains in the same state in the final RFC 2712, RFC 2246 and its > > > successors including this one. > > > > > > > > Changing the first Kerberos cipher suite value, or moving all of > them, > > > would now not make any sense. Enhancing the note as suggested is > probably > > > enough to mention how one Fortezza cipher suite disappeared. > > > > > > > > Instructions: > > > > ------------- > > > > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please > > > > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or > > > > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party > > > > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------- > > > > RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10) > > > > -------------------------------------- > > > > Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol > > > Version 1.2 > > > > Publication Date : August 2008 > > > > Author(s) : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla > > > > Category : PROPOSED STANDARD > > > > Source : Transport Layer Security > > > > Area : Security > > > > Stream : IETF > > > > Verifying Party : IESG > > > > > > >
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