I don't really think this is a useful erratum against 5246; the note there
is providing an explanation for why certain values are not used (and should
not be used).  But, now, and even at the time 5246 was published, 0x001e
*is* used, and there's no reason to mention it in this context.  One could
perhaps argue that 2712 should have noted that a value was being reused (or
have not reused the value at all), and an errata report against 2712 to add
a new appendix section might be reasonable.

So, absent additional considerations, I plan to reject this report.

-Ben

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 04:01:35PM +0200, Eugène Adell wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I had some doubts whether it was technical or editorial, and I have looked
> at some accepted errata to choose (maybe not the best method) . I thought
> it was technical, because one cipher suite was replaced by another one, and
> the note already existing gives their numbers, which is a technical
> information.
> 
> Although the "mistake" first appears in RFC2712 draft 01, RFC2246 final
> release was published before the final RFC2712.
> RFC2246 is obsoleted but mentions Fortezza, which RFC2712 doesn't. RFC5246
> being the only non obsoleted child of RFC2246 mentionning the Fortezza
> group, it looked more natural to suggest the errata at this place instead
> of RFC2712 which is fully dedicated to Kerberos.
> 
> 
> best regards
> Eugène
> 
> 
> 
> Le mar. 26 juin 2018 à 15:21, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> a écrit :
> 
> > First, I think this is editorial.  After all these years, I’m not really
> > sure it’s an interop problem.
> >
> > Second, if I were making this I would have placed the errata against
> > RFC2712 where the values were assigned.  It’s not really TLS1.2’s place to
> > clear this up.
> >
> > spt
> >
> > > On Jun 26, 2018, at 08:28, RFC Errata System <rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
> > > "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > You may review the report below and at:
> > > http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5409
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > Type: Technical
> > > Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.ad...@gmail.com>
> > >
> > > Section: Appendix A.5
> > >
> > > Original Text
> > > -------------
> > >   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
> > >   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
> > >   SSL 3.
> > >
> > > Corrected Text
> > > --------------
> > >   Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
> > >   reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
> > >   SSL 3. The cipher suite value { 0x00, 0x1E } firstly also assigned to
> > >   Fortezza has been released and has since been be reassigned.
> > >
> > > Notes
> > > -----
> > > RFC 2712 (Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer
> > Security) in its Draft 01 version introduces three new cipher suites
> > colliding with the three Fortezza ones. The Draft 02 version partially
> > corrects that, by moving the Kerberos cipher suites values by two.
> > > This omission of the third cipher suite has never been corrected, and
> > this remains in the same state in the final RFC 2712, RFC 2246 and its
> > successors including this one.
> > >
> > > Changing the first Kerberos cipher suite value, or moving all of them,
> > would now not make any sense. Enhancing the note as suggested is probably
> > enough to mention how one Fortezza cipher suite disappeared.
> > >
> > > Instructions:
> > > -------------
> > > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> > > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
> > >
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10)
> > > --------------------------------------
> > > Title               : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
> > Version 1.2
> > > Publication Date    : August 2008
> > > Author(s)           : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
> > > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > > Source              : Transport Layer Security
> > > Area                : Security
> > > Stream              : IETF
> > > Verifying Party     : IESG
> >
> >

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