If I am conflating them, it’s on purpose to draw out the differences. I’m not an Equifax customer, for example.
The key point in my note is this: how would TLS interception prevent these kinds of things, given that interceptable TLS did not? From: Yoav Nir <ynir.i...@gmail.com> Date: Thursday, March 15, 2018 at 12:57 AM To: Rich Salz <rs...@akamai.com> Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org> Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS to protect customers Hi, Rich. You are conflating customers and users. The customer that may be protected by breaking TLS in a bank’s server farm is the bank itself. An IPS system with visibility into the traffic may detect bots that are there to steal data or mine cryptocurrencies or whatever. If the customers of the bank are protected, it’s a happy side effect (collateral benefit?). The object is to protect the system integrity and the data. Yoav On 15 Mar 2018, at 5:29, Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com<mailto:rs...@akamai.com>> wrote: Some on this list have said that they need to break into TLS in order to protect customers. The thing customers seem to need the most protection is having their personal data stolen. It seems to happen with amazing and disappointing regularity on astounding scales. Some examples include · retailer Target, presumably subject to PCI-DSS rules · Anthem health insurance, presumably a regulated industry · Equifax, a financial-business organization (but apparently not regulated) · Yahoo, a company created on and by and for the Internet (one would think they know better) We could, of course, go on and on and on. NONE of those organizations are using TLS 1.3. So what kind of “protect the customer” requires breaking TLS? And what benefits and increased protection will customers see? _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org<mailto:TLS@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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