Spoke too soon I got the double the in the following PR: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1164
spt > On Mar 5, 2018, at 08:30, Sean Turner <s...@sn3rd.com> wrote: > > The double “the” got fixed, but the double and didn’t I submitted a PR so we > don’t forget this. > > spt > >> On Mar 4, 2018, at 22:52, M K Saravanan <mksa...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >> In TLSv1.3, draft 26, there is a small typographical error. It needs >> to be corrected. >> >> >> (1) >> >> Appendix D. Backward Compatibility >> >> Second Paragraph. Second sentence. There is a double "and". >> >> /* Original */ >> ========= >> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long >> as >> the ClientHello format remains compatible and and there is at least >> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server. >> ========== >> >> /* Corrected */ >> >> ====== >> Servers can also handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long >> as >> the ClientHello format remains compatible and there is at least >> one protocol version supported by both the client and the server. >> ====== >> >> (2) >> >> Section 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters >> >> First paragraph, first sentence. There is a double "the". >> >> /* Original */ >> ========= >> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the the >> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure. >> ========= >> >> /* Corrected */ >> ========= >> ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the >> opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure. >> ========= >> >> (3) >> >> Appendix E.5. Replay Attacks on 0-RTT >> >> Second paragraph, second line. There is a double "the". >> >> /* Original */ >> =========== >> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks >> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the the >> speed of cryptographic operations. >> =========== >> >> /* Corrected */ >> ========== >> If data can be replayed a large number of times, additional attacks >> become possible, such as making repeated measurements of the >> speed of cryptographic operations. >> ========== >> >> Please correct them. >> >> with regards, >> Saravanan >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
