Hi folks, This is way outside the range of my DISCUSS, so maybe we should change the thread title.
Paul, can you walk me through the security value of a proof of nonexistence here? Perhaps describe an attack that it stops. -Ekr On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:09 PM, Paul Wouters <p...@nohats.ca> wrote: > On Thu, 1 Mar 2018, Shumon Huque wrote: > > I do not know if the draft authors and/or WG have an appetite to do the >> much >> more major change suggested by Viktor (i.e in-protocol pinning TTL >> commitment >> and requiring subsequent denial of existence proof if DANE is removed). >> > > I think it is worth discussing in London and/or some people meeting up > to talk about this and bring something to the list/WG. > > The original idea of this extension I believe (and one of my reasons > behind writing RFC 7901) was to provide an alternative path for DNS > that couldn't be blocked or broken and that provides DNS answers without > additional latency. To me, that always included proof of non-existence, > as it would come in as the answer to a DNS chain-query via TLS headers > as the transport. > > I don't know why this got turned into something that is almost like DNS > but not quite DNS. I think that is a mistake. > > The TLS extension should be nothing more (and nothing less) than > stappled DNS suitable for a DNS routines. > > Paul > >
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