On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 05:36:12PM -0600, Nico Williams wrote: > On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:24:31AM -0500, Shumon Huque wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Shumon Huque <shu...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Several of us were well aware of this during the early days of the > > > draft, but perhaps many folks did not fully appreciate the impacts > > > until I elaborated on them last year, and added text that described > > > the "adversary with fraudulently obtained PKIX credentials" attack. > > > > Following up to my own message, sorry .. > > > > It occurred to me that perhaps a good way to mitigate this risk is > > a combo of mechanisms like CAA and Certificate Transparency logs. > > NO. That's insanely complicated. A pin-for-X-minutes TTL is trivial. > Let's do this pin-to-DANE thing.
And I should add that if you'd work around downgrades by using CT, then why bother with this extension *AT ALL*?! I can't be emphatic enough about this. This is an utter waste of everyone's time here if we don't have this pin-to-DANE feature in this draft. The authors' time, the WG's time, the IESG's time, and implementors' time. Nico -- _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
