On Sun, Jul 9, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bka...@akamai.com> wrote:
> On 07/09/2017 08:33 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > > Also, it considers Section 7.4.1.4 of RFC 5246, i.e. the same extensions >> SHOULD be included in case of request for session resumption. >> >> This also led to the design in the draft (i.e., the HMAC computed by the >> client and the provisioning of a session key K_S), so that the client does >> not require to contact the TA again in case of intended session resumption. >> > > It seems like if this is really important, the TA could just give the > client some small > number of tokens on initial contact. > > > I wonder if the desired properties could be obtained by having the TA be a > Kerberos KDC that only issues [Kerberos tickets targetting the TLS server's > Kerberos principal] to [Kerberos clients that are authorized to speak TLS > to the TLS server]. Then the TLS extension could just hold a Kerberos > authenticator that binds to the client random and the client can reuse the > kerberos ticket until it expires. > It's actually not clear to me why this needs to be bound to the CH at all, for the reasons I indicated in my review.... -Ekr > -Ben > > >
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