Dear all,

FYI, we have recently submitted a new draft proposing an extension for
(D)TLS 1.2/1.3.

The solution described in the draft addresses Denial of Service attacks
against the handshake protocol, allowing servers to promptly abort
invalid session set ups.

Feedback and comments are of course very welcome. Thanks a lot!

Best regards,
/Marco

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject:        New Version Notification for
draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-00.txt
Date:   Wed, 28 Jun 2017 07:40:45 -0700
From:   internet-dra...@ietf.org
To:     Marco Tiloca <marco.til...@ri.se>, Ludwig Seitz
<ludwig.se...@ri.se>, Maarten Hoeve <maarten.ho...@encs.eu>



A new version of I-D, draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Marco Tiloca and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:           draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake
Revision:       00
Title:          Extension for protecting (D)TLS handshakes against Denial of 
Service
Document date:  2017-06-28
Group:          Individual Submission
Pages:          12
URL:            
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-00
Htmlized:       
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-00


Abstract:
   This document describes an extension for TLS and DTLS to protect the
   server from Denial of Service attacks against the handshake protocol.
   The extension includes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the
   ClientHello message, computed by the Client through key material
   obtained from a Trust Anchor entity.  The server registered at the
   Trust Anchor derives the same key material and checks the MAC to
   determine whether continuing or aborting the handshake.

                                                                                
  


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

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