On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 5:36 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.i...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 8 Jul 2017, at 6:18, Timothy Jackson <tjack...@mobileiron.com> wrote:
>
> As an earlier poster asked, what advantage does this approach have over
> TLS-inspecting proxies? Every IPS/IDS/next gen firewall with which I am
> familiar is able to terminate at TLS connection, inspect/copy/filter, and
> then encrypt on a new TLS sessions.
>
> For high performance customers, the SSL accelerators can be sandwiched
> around the filter so all the crypto is done in hardware.
>
> The ways to prevent TLS inspection are cert pinning and client cert auth. If
> this is only within one's data center, then those features can be disabled
> if necessary, no?
>
> What use case am I missing that can't be achieved better by other means than
> static keys?
>
>
> They would like to store traffic captures encrypted and be able to decrypt
> them a little later if that is necessary. Storing plaintext is something
> that auditors (rightfully!) don’t like.

Then renencrypt the data on the storage device.
>
> They also don’t want to install TLS proxies all over the place.  That’s a
> large extra expense for them.

Nginx exists. What's the blocker?
>
> Yoav
>



-- 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.

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