On 7/7/2017 2:54 PM, Russ Housley wrote:
> Stephen:
> ...
>> And also: I'm sorry to have to say it, but I consider that
>> attempted weasel wording around the clear intent of 2804. The
>> clear and real effect if your wiretapping proposal were standardised
>> by the IETF would be that we'd be standardising ways in which
>> TLS servers can be compelled into breaking TLS - it'd be a standard
>> wiretapping API that'd be insisted upon in many places and would
>> mean significantly degrading TLS (only *the* most important
>> security protocol we maintain) and the community's perception
>> of the IETF. It's all a shockingly bad idea.
> I clearly disagree.  Otherwise, I would not have put any work into the draft.
Russ,

What are the specific mechanisms that would allow this technique to be
used where you
intend it, i.e. within a data center, and not where Stephen fears it
would be, i.e., on
the broad Internet? For example, what mechanism could a client use to
guarantee
that this sort of "static DH" intercept could NOT be used against them?

-- 
Christian Huitema


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