re-sending with the version 05 but removing the diff to be under the 100 KB
limit.
Yours,
Daniel
On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 9:28 PM, Daniel Migault <daniel.miga...@ericsson.com
> wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> Thank you for the feed backs. The version 05 contains all text changes you
> agreed. In addition, the text explaining dictionary/brute force has been
> removed and replace by a reference to 4279. The recommendation regarding to
> all PSK ciphers has been limited to the one of the document. Please see
> inline for more details.
>
> For some reasons I am not able to validate the submission of version 05. I
> have attached the diff with version 04 as well as the locally generated
> version 05.
>
> Yours,
> Daniel
>
> On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 7:40 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 6:00 AM, Daniel Migault <
>> daniel.miga...@ericsson.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> Thank you for your reviews. Please see my responses inline. If you agree
>>> with the text I will update the draft.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Daniel
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 10:11 PM, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
>>>> draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04: Discuss
>>>>
>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/stat
>>>> ement/discuss-criteria.html
>>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> DISCUSS:
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> The following text appears to have been added in -04
>>>>
>>>> A server receiving a ClientHello and a client_version indicating
>>>> (3,1) "TLS 1.0" or (3,2) "TLS 1.1" and any of the cipher suites from
>>>> this document in ClientHello.cipher_suites can safely assume that
>>>> the
>>>> client supports TLS 1.2 and is willing to use it. The server MUST
>>>> NOT negotiate these cipher suites with TLS protocol versions earlier
>>>> than TLS 1.2. Not requiring clients to indicate their support for
>>>> TLS 1.2 cipher suites exclusively through ClientHello.client_hello
>>>> improves the interoperability in the installed base and use of TLS
>>>> 1.2 AEAD cipher suites without upsetting the installed base of
>>>> version-intolerant TLS servers, results in more TLS handshakes
>>>> succeeding and obviates fallback mechanisms.
>>>>
>>>> This is a major technical change from -03, which, AFAIK, prohibited
>>>> the server from negotiating these algorithms with TLS 1.1 and below
>>>> and maintained the usual TLS version 1.2 negotiation rules.
>>>>
>>>> This is a very material technical change. I don't consider it wise,
>>>> but in any case it would absolutely need WG consensus, which I
>>>> don't believe that it has given the recent introduction.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I agree that the text is a technical change, and that it may not be
>>> appropriated to do so now. The reason I included it was that it was conform
>>> to the previous text, but I agree that implicit assumption of version 1.2
>>> may need some additional discussion especially regarding RFC5246 Appendix
>>> E. Unless you prefer further discussion I assume the text below address
>>> your concern.
>>>
>>> <t>The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for
>>> any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. Clients MUST NOT offer one of
>>> these cipher suites with a (D)TLS version that differs from TLS 1.2.
>>> Servers MUST NOT select one of these cipher suites with a TLS version that
>>> differs from TLS 1.2. A client MUST treat the selection of these cipher
>>> suites in combination with a version of TLS as an error and generate a
>>> fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert. </t>
>>>
>>
>> Yes, this seems fine
>>
>>
>> The discussion of dictionary attacks here seems inferior to that
>>>> in 4279. In particular, you only need to actively attack one
>>>> connection to capture the data you need for a brute force attack
>>>> despite the text there referring to trying "different keys".
>>>> Please correct that.
>>>>
>>>> I believe the text below address your concern:
>>>
>>> OLD:
>>> <t>Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy may allow an active
>>> attacker attempts to connect to the server and try different keys.
>>> For example, limited entropy may be provided by using a short PSK in
>>> which
>>> case an attacker may perform a brute-force attack. Another example
>>> includes the use of a PSK chosen by a human which thus may be exposed to
>>> dictionary attacks.</t>
>>>
>>> NEW:
>>> <t>Pre-Shared Keys security relies on its associated entropy, and it is
>>> RECOMMENDED to follow <xref target="4086"/> to ensure the PSK has enough
>>> entropy. Possible reasons for low entropy includes PSK chosen by humans or
>>> PSK of small length as well as using random generators with limited
>>> entropy. </t>
>>>
>>> <t>PSK of limited entropy may allow an attacker to test different PSK
>>> values against a valid output such as master secret or any output derived
>>> from it. In this document, the master secret is generated using the PSK as
>>> well as the ECDHE shared secret. The use of ECDHE limits the possibilities
>>> of passive eavesdropping attackers, as the ECDHE shared secret is not
>>> expected to be derived from the observed ECDH parameters. As a result,
>>> passive eavesdropping is unlikely to happen, and the collection of all
>>> necessary material relies on an active attack.
>>> An active attacker may collect the necessary material by setting a TLS
>>> session as a client with the legitimate server. One PSK is tested for each
>>> session, and a match occurs when key exchange succeeds. On the other hand,
>>> an active attacker may also consider gathering the necessary information
>>> for offline computation. One way consists in getting a legitimate client to
>>> establish a connection with the attacker. It is also assumed that the
>>> client will accept the ECDH parameters authenticated by the attacker's
>>> private key and finally returns the Finished message authenticating the
>>> exchange. The attacker will be then in possession of all the necessary
>>> information to perform a brute force attack.</t>
>>>
>>
>> Is there a reason to not just point directly to the 4279 security
>> considerations?
>>
>
> No, basically I tried to complete the previous text that missed the
> offline use case. The current version just point to 4279, without having
> the above text. If you think the text above is clarifying I can add it as
> well.
>
>> -
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> COMMENT:
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> The citations to TLS 1.3 still seem pretty muddled. I think you
>>>> should just stop referencing and discussing 1.3.
>>>>
>>>
>>> My understanding of your comment is that mentioning TLS 1.3 to further
>>> insisting that the code point are not valid for TLS 1.3 is confusing. I
>>> propose to:
>>>
>>> Explicitly mention the TLS version in the title:
>>>
>>> OLD title:
>>> ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
>>> Security (TLS)
>>>
>>> NEW title:
>>> ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
>>> Security (TLS)
>>>
>>> OLD Introduction:
>>>
>>> The cipher
>>> suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
>>> (TLS) [RFC5246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>] protocol, version
>>> 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer
>>> Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>], as well as version 1.3 of TLS
>>> [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>].
>>>
>>> NEW introduction
>>>
>>> The cipher
>>> suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
>>> (TLS) [RFC5246 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>] protocol, version
>>> 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer
>>> Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>].
>>>
>>>
>>> I suggest to keep the following text of the introduction:
>>>
>>>
>>> AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are
>>> strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525>] and non-AEAD algorithms are
>>> forbidden to use in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>].
>>> The AEAD
>>> algorithms considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The
>>> use of AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288>] and the use of AES-CCM
>>> is defined in [RFC6655 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655>].
>>>
>>>
>> Yes, this seems fine.
>>
>>
>>
>>> I suggest to keep the following text of the Applicable versions
>>> sections, as I believe the section discusses the cipher suites against all
>>> existing TLS versions. In addition, it also justifies somewhat that we only
>>> defined cipher suites that are compatible with TLS1.3.
>>>
>>> TLS version 1.3 and later negotiate these features in a different
>>> manner. Unlike TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 separates authentication and cipher
>>> suite negotiation [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>]
>>> Section 1.2
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04#section-1.2>.
>>> TLS 1.3 supports
>>> PSK with ECDHE key exchange and the cipher suites
>>> TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
>>> TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are part of the
>>> specification. As a result, TLS 1.3 and higher versions, negotiate
>>> and support these cipher suites in a different way.
>>>
>>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>> I suggest to remove the reference to TLS1.3 in the security
>>> considerations
>>>
>>> OLD
>>>
>>> The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>],
>>> TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04#ref-I-D.ietf-tls-tls13>],
>>> ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5489>], AES-GCM
>>> [RFC5288 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288>],
>>> and AES-CCM [RFC6655 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655>] apply to
>>> this document as well.
>>>
>>> NEW
>>>
>>> The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347>],
>>> ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5489>], AES-GCM
>>> [RFC5288 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288>],and AES-CCM [RFC6655
>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655>] apply
>>> to this document as well.
>>>
>>>
>>>> S 2.
>>>> I'm not sure that the discussion of the PRF is helpful here in
>>>> mandating the non-use of these cipher suites with TLS 1.1 and
>>>> below.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I find the text useful as it gives an idea why even introducing AEAD in
>>> TLS version lower than 1.2 is a bad idea, so I would prefer to keep it. The
>>> text has been changed to
>>>
>>> OLD:
>>> As such TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 should not be used with ECDHE_PSK.
>>>
>>> NEW:
>>> As such, all ECDHE_PSK
>>> ciphers, including those defined outside this document, SHOULD NOT be
>>> negotiated in TLS versions prior to 1.2.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think you should be levying a new normative requirement like this
>> for other ciphers
>> i this document
>>
>
> Consideration for other ciphers has been removed. The requirement is
> limited to the ciphers of the document. The new text is:
>
> As such, all ECDHE_PSK ciphers, including those defined in this document,
> SHOULD NOT be
> negotiated in TLS versions prior to 1.2.
>
>>
>> -Ek
>> r
>>
>>
>
Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft D. Migault
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: November 24, 2017 May 23, 2017
ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol version 1.2
draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05
Abstract
This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2. The cipher suites are all
based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared
Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-
CCM. PSK provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides
forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
integrity protection.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Mattsson & Migault Expires November 24, 2017 [Page 1]
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . 3
4. Applicable TLS Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key
(PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher
suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [RFC5246] protocol and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347].
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication is widely used in many scenarios.
One deployment is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to
authenticate both subscriber and network. Another deployment is
Internet of Things where PSK authentication is often preferred for
performance and energy efficiency reasons. In both scenarios the
endpoints are owned/controlled by a party that provisions the pre-
shared keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in
security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. Ephemeral Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance
and small key sizes. ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2
[RFC7540] and CoAP [RFC7252].
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AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are
strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525] and non-AEAD algorithms are
forbidden to use in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. The AEAD
algorithms considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The
use of AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288] and the use of AES-CCM
is defined in [RFC6655].
[RFC4279] defines Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suites for TLS but does
not consider Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [RFC4492] introduces
Elliptic Curve Cryptography for TLS but does not consider PSK
authentication. [RFC5487] describes the use of AES-GCM in
combination with PSK authentication, but does not consider ECDHE.
[RFC5489] describes the use of PSK in combination with ECDHE but does
not consider AES-GCM or AES-CCM.
3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites
The cipher suites defined in this document are based on the AES-GCM
and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM and AEAD_AES_128_CCM
defined in [RFC5116], and AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 defined in [RFC6655].
Messages and pre-master secret construction in this document are
defined in [RFC5489]. The ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange
messages are used and the pre-master secret is computed as for the
ECDHE_PSK key exchange. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the
Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis].
For TLS 1.2, the following cipher suites are defined:
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
The assigned code points can only be used for TLS 1.2.
4. Applicable TLS Versions
The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for
any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. Clients MUST NOT offer one
of these cipher suites with a (D)TLS version that differs from TLS
1.2. Servers MUST NOT select one of these cipher suites with a TLS
version that differs from TLS 1.2. A client MUST treat the selection
of these cipher suites in combination with a version of TLS as an
error and generate a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert.
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TLS version 1.3 and later negotiate these features in a different
manner. Unlike TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 separates authentication and cipher
suite negotiation [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 1.2. TLS 1.3 supports
PSK with ECDHE key exchange and the cipher suites
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are part of the
specification. As a result, TLS 1.3 and higher versions, negotiate
and support these cipher suites in a different way.
The cipher suites defined in this document make use of the
authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) defined in TLS
1.2 [RFC5246] and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347]. Earlier versions of TLS do not
have support for AEAD and consequently, the cipher suites defined in
this document MUST NOT be negotiated in TLS versions prior to 1.2.
In addition, it is worth noting that TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and TLS 1.2
[RFC4346] split the pre-master into two parts. The PRF results from
mixing the two pseudorandom streams with distinct hash functions (MD5
and SHA-1) by exclusive-ORing them together. In the case of
ECDHE_PSK authentication, the PSK and ECDHE shared secret are treated
by distinct hash function with distinct properties. This may
introduce vulnerabilities over the expected security provided by the
constructed pre-master. As such, all ECDHE_PSK ciphers, including
those defined in this document, SHOULD NOT be negotiated in TLS
versions prior to 1.2.
5. IANA Considerations
This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values
have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by
[RFC5246].
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05};
NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH. The cipher
suite numbers listed in the last column are numbers used for cipher
suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that IANA use these
values for assignment.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347],
PSK Ciphersuites for TLS [RFC4279], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM
[RFC5288], and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well.
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All the cipher suites defined in this document provide
confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. The
AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256 cipher
suites provide at least 192-bit security. However, AES_128_CCM_8
only provides 64-bit security against message forgery.
The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security
level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e., at least
128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the
AES-256 cipher suites.
GCM or CCM encryption - even of different clear text - re-using a
nonce with a same key undermines the security of GCM and CCM. As a
result, GCM and CCM MUST only be used with a system guaranteeing
nonce uniqueness [RFC5116].
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan
Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos
Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu, Joseph Salowey, Sean
Turner Dave Garrett, Martin Rex and Kathleen Moriarty for their
valuable comments and feedback.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]
Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls-
rfc4492bis-17 (work in progress), May 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress),
April 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
Mattsson & Migault Expires November 24, 2017 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft ECDHE_PSK_AEAD May 2017
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
Mattsson & Migault Expires November 24, 2017 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft ECDHE_PSK_AEAD May 2017
[RFC5489] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5489, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5489>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
Authors' Addresses
John Mattsson
Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Phone: +46 76 115 35 01
Email: john.matts...@ericsson.com
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
Canada
Phone: +1 514-452-2160
Email: daniel.miga...@ericsson.com
Mattsson & Migault Expires November 24, 2017 [Page 7]
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