It seems I had a typo in the new text.
Martin Rex wrote:
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-04: Discuss
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DISCUSS:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> The following text appears to have been added in -04
>>
>> A server receiving a ClientHello and a client_version indicating
>> (3,1) "TLS 1.0" or (3,2) "TLS 1.1" and any of the cipher suites from
>> this document in ClientHello.cipher_suites can safely assume that
>> the
>> client supports TLS 1.2 and is willing to use it. The server MUST
>> NOT negotiate these cipher suites with TLS protocol versions earlier
>> than TLS 1.2. Not requiring clients to indicate their support for
>> TLS 1.2 cipher suites exclusively through ClientHello.client_hello
That line should say
through ClientHello.client_version
>> improves the interoperability in the installed base and use of TLS
>> 1.2 AEAD cipher suites without upsetting the installed base of
>> version-intolerant TLS servers, results in more TLS handshakes
>> succeeding and obviates fallback mechanisms.
>>
>> This is a major technical change from -03, which, AFAIK, prohibited
>> the server from negotiating these algorithms with TLS 1.1 and below
>> and maintained the usual TLS version 1.2 negotiation rules.
>
> This change _still_ prohibits the server from negotiating these algorithms
> with TLSv1.1 and below.
>
> Could you elaborate a little on where and why you see a problem with this?
>
> As this change tries to explain, had such a text been used for all
> TLSv1.2 AEAD cipher suite code points, then browsers would have never
> needed any "downgrade dance" fallbacks, POODLE would have never
> existed as a browser problem, and the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV band-aid
> would not have been needed, either.
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